EBA MiCA Fines Methodology: Enforcement Risk for Significant Token Issuers

ByOfficer

Last updated: June 2026

MiCA defines maximum thresholds for administrative fines under Article 131, with ceilings dependent on issuer type. Until late June 2026, there was no published account of how the EBA would land on a figure inside that ceiling. The EBA has published a consultation on its approach to applying the MiCA fining framework under Article 131 for issuers under its direct supervisory remit, including significant ART and EMT issuers.

For the small population of issuers the EBA supervises directly, this consultation is the first published indication of the EBA’s intended approach to structuring fine calculation. It proposes a structured internal methodology intended to guide the exercise of discretion under Article 131, without changing the underlying statutory discretion or introducing binding formulas. The result still sits under the statutory ceilings, but the path to it is now visible enough to model.

The deadline to comment is 28 September 2026. The EBA consultation includes a public hearing, with registration details and timing specified in the official EBA announcement. That window matters because the methodology is non-binding supervisory guidance, which makes the consultation the practical moment to shape how discretion gets exercised.

What the EBA published, and the clock that matters

The document is a consultation paper, reference EBA/CP/2026/10, dated 26 June 2026, titled a methodology for setting fines under Regulation (EU) 2023/1114. The consultation runs for approximately three months from publication, with a stated closing date of 28 September 2026 as set out in the EBA consultation paper, after which the EBA says it will finalise and publish the methodology. There is no draft Commission delegated act attached and no regulatory technical standard number, because this instrument is the EBA’s own administrative methodology rather than a Level 2 measure submitted for endorsement.

That distinction is relevant: the methodology is a non-binding supervisory guidance document issued by the EBA to structure discretion under Article 131 MiCA. It is not a regulatory technical standard or implementing act under Articles 10-15 of the ESAs Regulation framework, and does not require Commission adoption. The methodology describes how the EBA may structure its assessment of discretion under Article 131 MiCA, subject to final adoption after consultation, similar to supervisory penalty frameworks used in other EU financial regulation contexts. The methodology is informed by supervisory and enforcement practices across EU financial regulation, including banking supervision penalty approaches and other administrative sanction frameworks.

The consultation sets out proposed approaches on calibration of severity, factors, and proportionality and invites stakeholder feedback. An issuer with a view on any of those is responding to a question the EBA has explicitly asked.

Who the MiCA fines methodology binds, and the assumption that catches firms out

This is the first thing to check, and it is where the topic invites a mistake. The methodology applies to issuers of significant asset-referenced tokens and issuers of significant e-money tokens that fall under the EBA’s direct supervision following a significance classification under Article 117 of MiCA. The consultation focuses on issuers of significant ART and EMT under EBA supervision; CASPs and non-significant issuers fall under national competent authority enforcement under MiCA Article 111, subject to the specific supervisory allocation applicable to each case. The consultation paper states the point in its own footnote: the methodology does not apply to competent authorities’ enforcement procedures, and where a national competent authority determines the type and level of an administrative penalty or other administrative measure, Article 111 of MiCA applies instead.

Article 131 applies to issuers of significant ART and EMT under EBA supervision; CASPs are subject to national competent authority enforcement under Article 111, with the applicable penalty levels and implementation details varying by Member State within MiCA constraints. A CASP that breaches its authorisation conditions, custody duties or conduct obligations faces administrative penalties imposed by its national competent authority under Article 111, sized and reasoned under Article 112, and published under Article 114. The EBA’s Article 131 calculation never touches that case. The same is true for an issuer of an asset-referenced token that has not been classified as significant: its supervisor is the national competent authority of its home Member State, and the Article 111 maximum amounts apply to it, not the Article 131 ceilings.

The boundary turns entirely on the significance decision, the same threshold our guide to MiCAR token classification works through. Under Article 117, once the EBA classifies an asset-referenced token or an EMI-issued e-money token as significant, the EBA supervises the issuer’s compliance with a defined list of MiCA obligations, exercising the powers of a competent authority across reserve, own-funds, white-paper, redemption and governance requirements for asset-referenced tokens, and across the e-money-token conduct duties in Articles 55 and 58, which our stablecoin and EMT reporting guide covers. National competent authorities keep a role in the supervision of electronic money institutions issuing significant e-money tokens, which is why the EMT side of this regime is shared rather than exclusively held at EU level. The practical consequence for the issuer is that, once MiCA’s transfer of supervisory responsibility takes effect after significance classification, the body that can fine the issuer changes, and so does the rulebook for how the fine is calculated.

The legal architecture behind the number

Three articles do the work. Article 130 sets out supervisory measures available to the EBA under MiCA, including fines and related enforcement actions, when it finds an infringement listed in Annex V for asset-referenced tokens or Annex VI for e-money tokens, and the power to impose a fine sits inside that list at Article 130(1), point (b) and Article 130(2), point (b). Article 131 is the fining power itself, including the criteria the EBA must weigh and the maximum amounts. Article 134 sets the procedure: where there are clear and demonstrable grounds to suspect an infringement, the EBA appoints an independent investigation officer within the EBA who is not involved in the supervisory responsibilities for the relevant token, and under Article 134(8) the EBA decides whether an infringement has been committed and whether to impose a fine only after that officer has compiled the file and the persons concerned have had the chance to be heard.

Article 131(2) sets out the eleven criteria the EBA must have regard to when sizing a fine, running from the duration and frequency of the breach through to the measures the issuer took afterwards to prevent a repeat. The new methodology does not invent factors; it organises these statutory criteria into something an issuer can anticipate. Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1504 sets procedural rules for the exercise of EBA powers to impose fines or periodic penalty payments under MiCA, alongside MiCA’s own enforcement provisions. A practitioner mapping enforcement exposure needs both documents: the delegated regulation for how a case proceeds, and the methodology for how the resulting fine is quantified.

One point teams get wrong is the role of intent. A fine is available where the issuer or a member of its management body has acted intentionally or negligently, so negligence alone is enough to trigger Article 131. Intent is an aggravating factor that raises the amount once the gate is passed, not the threshold for passing it. Reading intent as a precondition understates exposure, because most reporting and disclosure failures are negligent rather than deliberate, and they are sanctionable all the same.

Step one: the basic amount, and why the infringement category decides almost everything

The first step fixes a basic amount expressed as a percentage of the issuer’s annual turnover in the preceding business year, set by the severity of the infringement. The consultation sets out a proposed structured approach for determining baseline amounts based on infringement categorisation under MiCA Annex V and Annex VI. The severity grouping and mapping of infringements into categories is part of the consultation proposal and not yet a finalised binding calibration.

The consultation proposes an indicative framework for grouping Annex V and Annex VI infringements and applying a baseline amount that is then adjusted using aggravating and mitigating factors. The detailed calibration (including any implied weighting or percentage levels) remains subject to consultation and is not fixed in binding form. The EBA has specifically asked respondents whether the proposed allocations correctly reflect the relative severity of each infringement type, and whether the associated percentage levels are set at an appropriate point within the Article 111 turnover figures from which they were drawn. That makes the severity classification, and the proposed percentages themselves, live consultation questions rather than settled figures.

There is a category that is easy to miss because it is not in Annexes V or VI at all. Providing incorrect or misleading information to the EBA, addressed in Article 122(2), point (f) and (3), point (f), and Article 123(2), refers back to Article 131 independently and is slotted into the third category, obstacles to supervisory activities. An issuer that assumes only the annexed infringements are fineable, and that a misleading data submission is a separate procedural matter, has the analysis backwards. The methodology also confirms that the basic amount is determined per infringement committed, so a single supervisory episode that involves several distinct breaches generates several basic amounts rather than one blended figure.

Step two: aggravating and mitigating coefficients, applied cumulatively

The second step adjusts the basic amount for the specifics of the case using coefficients. The consultation sets out a framework of aggravating and mitigating factors that may influence the adjustment of baseline amounts, including duration, repetition, intent, and compliance history. On the mitigating side, the consultation identifies circumstances that may reduce the baseline amount: where senior management took reasonable measures to prevent the breach, where the infringement was brought quickly and completely to the EBA’s attention, and where the issuer voluntarily took meaningful steps to stop a repeat. As with the aggravating factors, the specific coefficients proposed for each mitigating circumstance are subject to consultation.

The cumulative arithmetic is the detail most likely to trip up an internal estimate. The methodology applies aggravating and mitigating factors cumulatively, with the EBA retaining discretion on how multiple factors are combined within the overall adjustment stage. An issuer modelling a worst case by naively multiplying the basic amount by every aggravating coefficient at once will overstate the figure, and one that assumes a single act of self-reporting wipes most of the fine will understate it, because the mitigant is one input into a cumulative calculation rather than a discount applied to the final number.

The coefficients quantify the Article 131(2) criteria that can be sized in advance, which the EBA identifies as points (a) to (e), (i), (j) and (k). The three criteria that resist a fixed coefficient, the issuer’s financial strength, the impact on token holders, and the importance of profits gained or losses avoided, are held back for the discretionary stage described next. This is the deliberate seam in the design: the formula does the routine work, and the harder-to-quantify factors are kept for a reasoned judgement at the end.

The ceiling, the discretion, and what the coefficients cannot escape

After the two steps, the EBA can move the figure again. The methodology lets the Board of Supervisors increase or decrease the calculated amount where the result would be disproportionate to the specific breach or would not deliver the deterrent effect the case needs, aiming at least to disgorge the profits made or losses avoided where those can be determined. This is where the residual Article 131(2) criteria, points (f), (g) and (h), and the EBA’s supervisory and consumer-protection objectives enter. The methodology also clarifies that for this purpose an issuer is read to include every co-issuer in a multi-issuance scheme, so a token issued jointly does not let any single participant shelter behind a smaller turnover.

Whatever the steps and the discretionary adjustment produce, the statutory ceilings bind. For an issuer of a significant asset-referenced token, the final fine cannot exceed 12.5 percent of annual turnover in the preceding business year, or twice the profits gained or losses avoided where those can be determined, under Article 131(3). For an issuer of a significant e-money token, the ceiling is 10 percent of annual turnover or twice the profits or losses avoided, under Article 131(4). The methodology spells out the order of operations: if the calculated amount is higher than the turnover ceiling and the EBA cannot determine the profits or losses, the fine is reduced to the 12.5 percent or 10 percent figure; if the EBA can determine that profits or losses exceed that turnover percentage, the fine is reduced where necessary to twice the profits or losses instead.

The asymmetry between the two ceilings is not cosmetic. A 12.5 percent cap for asset-referenced tokens against 10 percent for e-money tokens means the same conduct can carry a higher maximum for an ART issuer than for an EMT issuer, which matters for any group that issues both. The common error is to treat the ceiling as the expected fine. The ceiling caps what the formula and discretionary adjustment produce; most cases resolve well below it, and the ceiling does work only when the calculated amount would otherwise exceed it.

Periodic penalty payments under Article 132: a distinct enforcement tool

MiCA Article 132 establishes periodic penalty payments as a separate enforcement tool alongside administrative fines. The fines methodology covers Article 131 fines only; Article 132 provides the tool for compelling an issuer to stop an ongoing breach or to comply with an information request, investigation or on-site inspection, and it runs for each day of delay. MiCA provides for periodic penalty payments under Article 132, with calculation and duration rules defined directly in the Regulation.

A reporting team should not file periodic penalty payments under the same risk line as a one-off fine. The two can stack: a periodic penalty payment to force compliance during an open matter, and a fine under Article 131 for the underlying infringement once the investigation concludes. Both are administrative in nature under Article 133, both are enforceable through the civil procedure rules of the Member State where collection happens, and both are allocated to the general budget of the Union rather than to the EBA.

How this sits against the Article 111 regime for everyone else

For the much larger population of CASPs and non-significant issuers supervised at national level, the comparison is instructive because the EBA borrowed from it. Under Article 111, MiCA requires Member States to provide for administrative sanctions and measures for breaches by crypto-asset service providers and issuers, including minimum sanction levels expressed in monetary amounts and/or turnover-based references, with exact calibration determined by the Regulation and national transposition. Market-abuse breaches under Articles 89 to 92 carry their own higher band, with legal-person maxima of at least EUR 15,000,000 or 15 percent of total annual turnover. Article 88 infringements carry a lower floor of at least EUR 2,500,000 or 2 percent of total annual turnover. For all market-abuse infringements under Article 111(5), an additional floor of at least three times the profits gained or losses avoided also applies where those can be determined. Those are floors that Member States must provide for, and Article 111 lets Member States set higher levels still.

Two traps follow from this split. First, the baseline references derive from MiCA Article 111 penalty ceilings, which serve as structural benchmarks for proportionality within the EBA methodology, but the EBA regime caps the final fine at the Article 131 turnover ceiling, not at the Article 111 figure, so reading across from one to the other without tracking which ceiling governs the case produces the wrong number. Second, because Article 111 sets minimum maximum penalties that Member States transpose into national law, the actual exposure of a CASP or a non-significant issuer varies by Member State, while the EBA’s Article 131 regime for significant issuers is uniform across the Union. A group that benchmarks its significant-issuer exposure against a national CASP precedent is comparing a harmonised EU ceiling with a transposed national one, and the two will not line up.

Whichever regime applies, the outcome is reviewable. A national penalty under Article 111 is subject to a right of appeal before a court under Article 113, and a fine, periodic penalty payment or other measure imposed by the EBA can be taken to the Court of Justice, which Article 136 gives unlimited jurisdiction to annul, reduce or increase the amount. The EBA must also publish its fines and periodic penalty payments under Article 133 unless disclosure would seriously jeopardise financial stability or cause disproportionate damage, so for significant issuers the reputational exposure travels alongside the financial one.

Frequently Asked Questions

Does this methodology apply to crypto-asset service providers?

No. The consultation paper states that the methodology applies to issuers of significant asset-referenced tokens and significant e-money tokens under the EBA’s direct supervision, and that where a national competent authority determines a penalty, Article 111 of MiCA applies instead. CASPs are supervised and penalised at national level under Articles 111 and 112, outside this methodology.

What are the maximum fines the EBA can impose under Article 131?

For an issuer of a significant asset-referenced token, up to 12.5 percent of annual turnover in the preceding business year, or twice the profits gained or losses avoided where those can be determined. For an issuer of a significant e-money token, up to 10 percent of annual turnover or twice the profits or losses avoided. These are maximum amounts, not the expected fine in a typical case.

How does the EBA arrive at the basic amount of a fine?

The consultation proposes that the basic amount be set as a percentage of annual turnover keyed to the severity of the infringement. Each infringement point in Annex V or Annex VI is proposed to be allocated to one of three categories: conflicts of interest, organisational or operational requirements; disclosure and transparency; or obstacles to supervisory activities. The associated percentage levels, and the allocation of each annex point to a category, are among the matters the EBA has specifically asked respondents to comment on.

What aggravating and mitigating factors change the amount?

The consultation sets out a framework of aggravating and mitigating factors that may adjust the baseline amount, covering elements such as duration, repetition, intent, organisational weakness, compliance history, and steps taken to prevent recurrence. They apply cumulatively, with the EBA retaining discretion on how multiple factors are combined. The specific coefficients proposed for each factor are subject to consultation.

Is the methodology a binding regulatory technical standard?

No. It is a supervisory methodology intended to guide the EBA’s exercise of discretion under Article 131 within the MiCA framework, without amending the underlying Regulation. The procedural rules for imposing fines and periodic penalty payments sit separately in Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1504.

When does the consultation close and how can issuers respond?

The consultation closing date is set in the EBA consultation paper (EBA/CP/2026/10) as 28 September 2026, with responses submitted through the consultation page. The EBA consultation includes a public hearing, with registration details and timing specified in the official EBA announcement. The six questions focus on the severity classification, the percentage levels, the factors, the coefficients, flexibility for the Board of Supervisors, and the application of the maximum amounts.

Are periodic penalty payments covered by this methodology?

No. Periodic penalty payments under Article 132 are a distinct tool whose calculation and duration rules are set directly in the Regulation. The fines methodology addresses Article 131 fines only.

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Key Takeaways

  • The EBA MiCA fines methodology, consultation EBA/CP/2026/10 dated 26 June 2026, applies only to issuers of significant asset-referenced tokens and significant e-money tokens under the EBA’s direct supervision, not to CASPs or non-significant issuers.
  • It is a supervisory methodology intended to guide the EBA’s exercise of discretion under Article 131 within the MiCA framework, without amending the underlying Regulation; procedural rules sit separately in Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1504.
  • Step one sets a basic amount keyed to the severity band of the infringement under Annex V or Annex VI, with the proposed percentage levels and infringement classifications subject to the live consultation.
  • Step two adjusts that amount with aggravating and mitigating factors applied cumulatively, with the EBA retaining discretion on how multiple factors are combined; the specific proposed coefficients are also subject to consultation.
  • The final fine is capped at 12.5 percent of turnover for significant ART issuers and 10 percent for significant EMT issuers, or twice the profits gained or losses avoided where determinable, under Article 131(3) and (4).
  • MiCA Article 132 establishes periodic penalty payments as a distinct enforcement tool, with rates and duration set directly in the Regulation; Article 131 fines and Article 132 periodic penalty payments can both apply in an enforcement matter.
  • The consultation closing date is set in the EBA consultation paper (EBA/CP/2026/10) as 28 September 2026, with a public hearing as specified in the official EBA announcement, and the six questions invite comment on the severity classification, percentages and coefficients.

Sources and References

What significant-token issuers should weigh before 28 September

For the issuers actually in scope, the value of this consultation is that the EBA has shown the mechanics it will use, including the seam between the formula and the residual discretion the Board of Supervisors keeps. A response is most useful where it tests the calibration the EBA asked about: whether a given Annex V or Annex VI point really belongs in the right severity category, whether the proposed coefficients for systemic weakness and intent sit proportionately relative to each other, and whether the approach to cumulative adjustment produces proportionate outcomes for an issuer with both aggravating and mitigating factors in the same case. Everyone else, the CASPs and the non-significant issuers, should read the methodology to understand the EBA’s thinking, then go back to Article 111 and their own national transposition for the regime that actually governs them, while watching the EC MiCAR review consultation that may reshape the wider framework over time.

Disclaimer: The information on RegReportingDesk.com is for educational and informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal, regulatory, tax, or compliance advice. Always consult your compliance officer, legal counsel, or the relevant supervisory authority for guidance specific to your institution.

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