Standing Liquidity Facility: OSFI and BoC Call Overnight Draws Routine

ByRegReportingDesk
RegReportingDesk card: Bank of Canada, Canada

On 29 September 2026 the Bank of Canada and the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) issued a joint statement on the Bank’s Standing Liquidity Facility (SLF), the facility that gives participants in Lynx, Canada’s high-value payment system, secured liquidity both intraday and overnight. Its operative sentence is short: overnight SLF draws “are not considered exceptional liquidity measures by OSFI or the Bank.”

For a Canadian deposit-taker that participates in Lynx, that sentence reaches into settings that may have been calibrated on the opposite assumption: how large an end-of-day settlement balance to hold, which events invoke the contingency funding plan, and how an overnight advance is explained when it shows up in a month-end liquidity coverage ratio (LCR). On the same afternoon, Deputy Governor Toni Gravelle told a New York audience that financial institutions hesitate to use the SLF overnight because they worry it “could send the wrong signal.”

OSFI’s Liquidity Adequacy Requirements (LAR) guideline, the regulatory returns and the ratios all stay as they were. The practical effect lands in the internal documents built around how an SLF draw is read, and in the collateral and buffer decisions that follow from them.

Related reading: Riksbank Borrowing Capacity Test: What Banks Must Verify About Central Bank Liquidity Access

The 2026 calendar around the SLF statement

Most of the documents the statement touches were reissued or reviewed this year. The dates that matter for a liquidity reporting team:

  • 9 March 2026: the Bank issued the current Rules Governing Advances to Financial Institutions. The version effective 11 August 2020 ceased to have effect except for advances made under it that remain outstanding. The joint statement makes SLF use subject to these Rules.
  • 1 May 2026: the LAR (2026) guideline took effect, including Chapter 1 (overview), Chapter 2 (liquidity coverage ratio) and Chapter 7 (intraday liquidity monitoring tools), each dated 29 January 2026.
  • June 2026: Bank staff published Staff Analytical Paper 2026-26 on the SLF, which the joint statement cites for further detail.
  • 20 July 2026: comment deadline on OSFI’s draft LAR Guideline (2027).
  • 29 September 2026, 13:20 ET: the joint statement, published as a Bank market notice and on OSFI’s site, alongside Deputy Governor Gravelle’s remarks on repo markets and monetary policy implementation.
  • February 2027 and 1 May 2027: OSFI’s planned publication of the final LAR (2027) and its effective date, according to OSFI’s May 2026 backgrounder.

The statement itself carries no implementation date and no transition period.

Four points the Bank of Canada and OSFI put on the record

The statement runs to a few short paragraphs. Four points in it carry weight for liquidity planning.

First, the SLF is framed as a tool of the Bank’s operational framework for monetary policy implementation. It helps reinforce the policy interest rate and supports the effective functioning of Lynx. Second, it gives Lynx participants secured liquidity, intraday and overnight, as part of routine liquidity management, and a participant that is short cash at the end of the business day automatically receives an overnight SLF advance. The statement describes those overnight advances as non-discretionary in Lynx and as a normal part of a participant’s daily payment system activity.

Third, both authorities consider SLF use by Lynx participants consistent with routine liquidity management, and participants “can use the facility as needed.” Fourth, overnight SLF draws are not treated as exceptional liquidity measures by either authority, and both will keep engaging with Lynx participants on the facility’s role in day-to-day liquidity management.

The “as needed” sentence carries a footnote: use is subject to the Bank’s Rules Governing Advances to Financial Institutions. That footnote marks the boundary of the whole statement. Everything the Rules require before an advance can be made still applies, starting with paragraph 4(a): the institution must be a Lynx participant and must be able to give the Bank valid and enforceable first-priority security in collateral acceptable for SLF advances. Pricing is also untouched. Paragraph 7(b)(i) of the Rules sets interest on Lynx advances at the Bank Rate as of the credit date.

Two things are absent from the text. It names no frequency or size beyond which SLF use stops being routine, and it says nothing about the Bank’s other lending facilities. Both gaps limit how far the word “routine” can be stretched inside an institution’s own policies.

From intraday loan to overnight SLF advance without a request

The overnight path involves no borrowing decision at all. Under paragraph 6(a) of the Rules, intraday loans are never applied for. A loan is deemed requested when a participant apportions part of its credit limit to a Lynx account, and the aggregate outstanding at any time cannot exceed that credit limit. Paragraph 6(b) applies the same logic overnight: an Overnight Advance is deemed requested if a net intraday loan balance remains during the Lynx finalization window, in an amount equal to that balance, so the participant can repay its intraday loan. The advance runs for one business day under paragraph 7(a)(ii).

The credit limit comes from collateral. Participants pledge a pool of SLF-eligible collateral to the Bank, and paragraph 8(c) of the Rules requires them to allocate amounts of that pool, through the Bank’s High Availability Banking System (HABS), to specific purposes including Lynx advances. The staff paper describes the pool as revalued each business day before Lynx opens. For the start of 2026 it put collateral pledged in HABS at nearly $75 billion, of which roughly $30 billion was allocated to Lynx and other collateral requirements, leaving about $45 billion in excess collateral.

The staff paper also gives the clock. A participant with a negative cash position in Lynx at 6:30 p.m. has its intraday loan automatically converted into an overnight SLF advance and pays the Bank Rate, which the paper describes as the policy interest rate plus 25 basis points. A participant with a long position deposits the excess with the Bank and earns the deposit rate, set 5 basis points below the policy rate with effect from 30 January 2025. An intraday loan repaid within the same business day carries no interest.

The automatic path has a governance consequence. Collateral securing an overnight advance stays encumbered until the advance and interest are repaid on the next business day, and only then becomes available for other purposes, according to the staff paper’s worked example. A treasury policy that requires pre-approval before “borrowing from the central bank” cannot operate on this path as written, because the advance is made at the finalization window without any instruction from the participant. The decision to document is who is told afterwards, and within what time.

Why a Standing Liquidity Facility draw became a signal in a floor system

The staff paper’s history shows how rare overnight draws have become. Under the corridor system the Bank ran before 2020, daily settlement balances were typically $250 million or less, and the staff paper counts roughly 20 to 55 overnight SLF advances a year between 2013 and 2019. The Bank moved to a floor system in March 2020 and decided in April 2022 to keep it permanently. With ample settlement balances in the system, the paper counts just under 10 overnight advances since March 2020, ranging from under $50 million to almost $900 million.

A facility drawn overnight a handful of times in six years is easy to read as a distress event. The staff paper answers that reading directly: because intraday loans and overnight SLF advances are automatic and non-discretionary in Lynx, “no stigma should be attached to SLF use.” It lists ordinary causes of an end-of-day shortfall, including payment forecasting and processing problems, operational issues that delay payments, and falls in overall settlement balances when other Bank liabilities, in particular Government of Canada deposits, rise.

Intraday use is heavy by comparison. The paper puts average intraday loans at about $6 billion a day between September 2021 and September 2023 and about $11 billion more recently, and attributes the rise to participants choosing intraday loans over settlement balances to make payments.

The monetary policy motive sits in the Gravelle remarks. The Bank targets the overnight repo rate. Its best estimate of steady-state demand for reserves remains $50 billion to $70 billion, and it moved the deposit rate to 5 basis points below the policy rate in January 2025 to encourage institutions to redistribute reserves. Balances held only to avoid an SLF draw work against that aim.

The June 2026 staff paper records that, from January 2025, the Bank began automatically allowing Lynx participants to raise their non-mortgage loan portfolio (NMLP) pledge above the 20% concentration limit for time-critical financial market infrastructure settlements. The Bank’s current SLF collateral policy, published on 1 September 2026, instead states that the Bank will accept requests for a same-day increase above the 20% limit in exceptional cases, for a very limited period, where extremely large FMI-critical payment flows require it. For a parallel shift in another ample-reserves regime, see our note on RBA ample reserves and ADI liquidity.

One caveat on sourcing. Bank of Canada staff analytical papers carry a disclaimer that the views are the authors’ own and may differ from official Bank positions. The joint statement is the official position; the staff paper supplies the mechanics and the numbers.

Where “routine” stops: STLF, ELA and other Bank advances

The Rules list several advance types, and the joint statement speaks to the SLF only. The distinction matters for any internal taxonomy that books all central bank borrowing under one heading.

Lynx intraday loans and SLF overnight advances are loans the Bank is required by the Lynx By-law to make (paragraphs 3(a)(i) and 3(a)(ii) of the Rules). The Standing Term Liquidity Facility (STLF) is a term loan made at the Bank’s discretion to address temporary liquidity stress where the Bank has no concerns about the borrower’s financial soundness (paragraph 3(a)(iv)), and it is applied for through a loan application (paragraph 6(d)). Emergency Lending Assistance (ELA) is also discretionary and addresses a serious and persistent withdrawal of liquidity, including in the recovery or resolution of the entity (paragraph 3(b)(i)). An ELA or Other Advance application follows a consultation with a Deputy Governor or another person the Bank designates (paragraph 6(e)), and these term advances cannot exceed six months (paragraph 7(a)(iii)). ACSS Default Advances, provided unilaterally so that a direct or group clearer can settle its obligations in the Automated Clearing Settlement System, are a separate type again.

The statement’s “not exceptional” language attaches to overnight SLF draws. Nothing in it extends that reading to an STLF or ELA advance, and the Rules describe those facilities in terms of temporary liquidity stress and a serious and persistent withdrawal of liquidity. An early-warning dashboard that treats an overnight SLF advance and an STLF drawdown as the same signal now contradicts the supervisor on one of them.

Eligibility differs as well. Paragraph 4(f) of the Rules states that Schedule III banks (foreign bank branches) and non-deposit-taking institutions are not eligible for STLF or ELA. A foreign bank branch that participates in Lynx and meets the collateral test can receive Lynx advances under paragraph 4(a), but the term facilities sitting behind them are closed to it.

Collateral sets widen along the same line. The staff paper’s comparison shows the STLF accepting all SLF-eligible collateral plus NMLP without the concentration limit and certain residential mortgage loans, and ELA accepting all STLF-eligible collateral plus commercial mortgages. The paper sets the SLF beside the Bank of England’s Operational Standing Facility, which it lists at Bank Rate plus 15 basis points; for the UK collateral framework itself, see our piece on 2026 Sterling Monetary Framework collateral eligibility changes.

Which deposit-takers the statement reaches

The statement is addressed to Lynx participants, a narrower group than Canadian deposit-takers as a whole.

Payments Canada sets four conditions for a member to participate directly in Lynx: a settlement account at the Bank of Canada, the facilities to pledge collateral to the Bank for Lynx purposes, the technical requirements in the Lynx rules, and Swift membership. There is no minimum volume or value. Direct participants make Lynx payments for themselves and their customers, so an institution that sends wires through a participant has no SLF relationship of its own.

When Payments Canada announced the Lynx launch on 1 September 2021, it listed 16 participants, the Bank of Canada among them. Alongside the large domestic banks the list included ATB Financial, Central 1 Credit Union and Fédération des caisses Desjardins du Québec, plus foreign-owned participants such as Bank of America and State Street. That list may have changed since, so current participation should be confirmed against Payments Canada’s own information.

OSFI speaks for OSFI. The LAR guideline applies to banks, federally regulated trust or loan companies, and bank holding companies incorporated or formed under Part XV of the Bank Act (Chapter 1, paragraph 1). The Rules separately recognise Payments Canada members that are provincially prudentially regulated (paragraph 4(b)(i)). Where a Lynx participant answers to a provincial prudential supervisor, the Bank’s half of the statement applies to it as a Lynx participant, while OSFI’s half records OSFI’s supervisory view; no provincial supervisor co-signed the statement.

Reporting follows the same line. LAR Chapter 1, paragraph 4, says the Chapter 7 intraday tools segment institutions by whether they are direct clearers in Lynx: many of the tools apply to all institutions, but only direct clearers must submit regulatory reporting for intraday liquidity risk. A small or medium-sized deposit-taker that clears through a participant is reached by the statement only through that clearing participant, which holds the SLF access.

An overnight SLF advance in LAR metrics and monthly returns

LAR (2026) was left untouched by the statement, so an advance outstanding on a reporting date follows the existing LCR text in Chapter 2. Three paragraphs do the work.

Paragraph 94 assumes no reduction in funding availability for maturing secured funding transactions with the institution’s domestic central bank, and the run-off table in paragraph 95 applies 0% to secured funding backed by Level 1 assets or with central banks. An overnight SLF advance outstanding at month-end is secured funding from the Bank of Canada, so it adds no outflow on that reading.

Paragraph 19 governs the collateral. Assets in the high-quality liquid asset (HQLA) stock must be unencumbered, while HQLA-qualifying assets pre-positioned with or pledged to the central bank that have not been used to generate liquidity may be included. HQLA actually encumbered to an outstanding overnight advance therefore cannot remain in the HQLA stock. Where Level 1, Level 2 and other assets are held in a collateral pool and no specific securities are assigned to the transaction, however, LAR (footnote 6 to paragraph 19) permits the institution to assume that assets are encumbered in order of increasing liquidity value: non-HQLA first, followed by Level 2B, Level 2A and finally Level 1, provided the determination complies with any concentration or diversification requirements of the central bank. The HQLA effect therefore depends on which assets are treated as encumbered under those rules.

Paragraph 5 frames what a lower ratio means. The standard requires the LCR to be no lower than 100% absent financial stress, and during stress institutions should use their HQLA, with OSFI adjusting its response flexibly to the circumstances. Principle 8 of Guideline B-6 sets the matching management expectation: actively manage collateral positions, differentiating between encumbered and unencumbered assets.

The reporting cadence also stays where it was. Under LAR Chapter 1, the LCR goes to OSFI monthly with a lag of no more than 14 calendar days; D-SIBs should have the operational capacity to move to weekly or even daily reporting in stress at OSFI’s discretion, other institutions to weekly, and the stress lag is three business days (paragraph 24). The net cumulative cash flow (NCCF) return is monthly on the same lags (paragraph 28). Direct clearers of Lynx report the intraday monitoring tools monthly within 14 calendar days (paragraph 35).

Chapter 7 groups those tools into a first category (daily maximum intraday liquidity usage, available intraday liquidity at the start of the business day, total payments and time-specific obligations), a correspondent banking category, and intraday throughput for direct participants. Its list of an institution’s own sources of intraday liquidity includes collateral pledged with the central bank that can be freely converted into intraday liquidity.

Teams that also file under the EU CRR will recognise the architecture from our LCR, NSFR and ALMM reporting guide, but the Canadian paragraph references and lags come from LAR. The notification that still bites is in Chapter 1, paragraph 25: notify OSFI immediately if the LCR has fallen, or is expected to fall, below 100%. An institution running close to that line should test whether the encumbrance from a plausible overnight advance could cross it on a reporting date.

Contingency funding plan triggers under Guideline B-6

OSFI’s Guideline B-6: Liquidity Principles (2020) sets 13 principles. Principle 9 calls for a formal contingency funding plan (CFP), which the guideline describes as an institution’s strategy for handling a variety of prospective liquidity stress events. It expects a mechanism to track and monitor eligible collateral to secure back-up emergency liquidity facilities from private sources and/or central banks, and it requires institutions to notify OSFI upon the initialization or de-escalation of a CFP.

That notification duty is where the joint statement has the most practical reach. If a CFP lists any draw on a Bank of Canada facility as an invocation trigger, an unexpected overnight SLF advance invokes the plan and produces an OSFI notification for an event OSFI has said it does not treat as exceptional. The statement does not instruct institutions to rewrite their CFPs, and the B-6 text in force remains the 2020 guideline that LAR (2026) still references. Recalibrating a trigger remains the institution’s own decision under its liquidity risk tolerance.

A trigger design consistent with both documents separates the event from its cause. The inputs that distinguish a routine advance from a warning sign are:

  • the cause of the end-of-day shortfall, such as a delayed inbound payment or a forecasting miss, against a loss of funding;
  • repetition and size, measured against the Lynx credit limit and the collateral allocated in HABS;
  • the facility involved, since a discretionary STLF or ELA advance sits outside the statement;
  • whether the shortfall coincided with other early-warning indicators already in the CFP.

Principle 12 of B-6 is unaffected: an institution should actively manage its intraday liquidity positions and risks to meet payment and settlement obligations on a timely basis under both normal and stressed conditions, and understand the liquidity implications of a payments system disruption.

Sizing end-of-day balances with the SLF as backstop

The Gravelle remarks state the Bank’s intent plainly: any Lynx member “should feel comfortable using the SLF for unexpected shortfalls in end-of-day liquidity instead of holding extra reserves just to avoid SLF draws.” The qualifier “unexpected” carries weight. A funding need that recurs every day is a different fact pattern from a delayed inbound payment, and the joint statement does not address it.

The pricing sits in the operating band described in the staff paper: the Bank Rate at 25 basis points above the policy rate, the deposit rate at 5 basis points below it. A precautionary buffer costs the return forgone on the extra balances every day it is held. The SLF costs the Bank Rate on the nights a shortfall actually occurs, plus the temporary encumbrance of the collateral behind it.

A smaller buffer shifts the load onto the collateral pool, because the overnight advance equals the net intraday loan balance and that balance cannot exceed the credit limit set by collateral allocated to Lynx. The Bank’s current collateral policy for the SLF sets constraints that a buffer review has to respect:

  • securities issued by the pledgor, or by any related entity, including covered bonds, cannot be used as collateral by the pledgor;
  • NMLP may make up no more than 20 percent of the total value of collateral pledged by an institution;
  • no more than 5 percent of the total value pledged may be the obligation of a single corporate, municipal or foreign private sector issuer, or related entity; this condition does not apply for borrowings of less than $10 million.

Those parameters are under review. The staff paper says the Bank is reviewing the SLF collateral and haircut policy, with the review anticipated to conclude within 12 to 18 months of the paper, and that updated haircuts will be released alongside the new policy. Repo market plumbing is moving at the same time: in August 2026 the Collateral Infrastructure and Market Practices Advisory Group (CIMPA) and the Canadian Depository for Securities (CDS) announced the start of a trial period for a fail fee framework on Government of Canada securities transactions, covered in our note on the GoC securities fail fee trial. A buffer reduction sized on today’s haircuts should record that assumption so it can be rerun when the new policy lands.

Frequently Asked Questions

Does an overnight SLF advance on a reporting date now require a separate note to OSFI?

The joint statement adds no notification requirement. The existing ones stand: LAR Chapter 1 asks institutions to notify OSFI immediately if the LCR or the NSFR has fallen, or is expected to fall, below 100%, and Guideline B-6 requires notice when a CFP is initialized or de-escalated. Beyond those, the statement says only that the Bank and OSFI will continue to engage with Lynx participants on the SLF’s role in day-to-day liquidity management.

Does collateral pre-positioned in HABS, or unused SLF capacity, count toward the LCR?

Two different answers. Under LAR Chapter 2, paragraph 19, HQLA-qualifying assets pledged to the central bank that have not been used to generate liquidity may stay in the stock. Paragraph 94 gives credit only for outstanding secured funding transactions, not for unused collateral or merely the capacity to borrow. Collateral that sits outside the HQLA definitions adds borrowing capacity at the Bank without adding to the stock.

Does the Bank publish which institution drew on the SLF?

The staff paper’s comparison table describes SLF usage as reported on the Bank’s balance sheet as a line item for reporting periods, with the Quarterly Financial Report as the reference. It describes no institution-level publication. The same table notes that the ECB and the Bank of England publish aggregate usage of their comparable facilities, the latter with a lag.

If a participant draws overnight on several consecutive days, is that still routine?

The statement sets no frequency threshold; participants can use the facility as needed, subject to the Rules. The Gravelle remarks frame routine use around unexpected end-of-day shortfalls. A run of draws driven by a predictable daily gap sits outside that example, and the institution’s own documentation would need to explain it on its own terms.

We operate as a Schedule III foreign bank branch in Lynx. What does the statement change for us?

Paragraph 4(a) of the Rules makes Lynx advances available to any Lynx participant that can give first-priority security in acceptable collateral, and paragraph 4(f) excludes Schedule III banks from the STLF and ELA. For a branch in that position, the SLF is the Bank facility the statement describes as routine, and the term facilities remain unavailable whatever the statement says.

Does the statement cover ACSS Default Advances?

The statement addresses the SLF and Lynx participants only. ACSS Default Advances are a separate advance type under paragraph 3(a)(iii) of the Rules, provided unilaterally to settle a direct or group clearer’s net debit position or contribution obligations in the ACSS and secured by collateral pledged under the ACSS By-law. Whether an institution classifies them as routine is outside the text.

Key Takeaways

  • Cite the 29 September 2026 statement as the basis for any trigger change, and its Rules footnote as the limit: collateral, eligibility and Bank Rate pricing are unchanged.
  • Before the next monthly LCR submission, list every internal document that treats an overnight SLF advance as a stress event and mark each trigger keep, recalibrate or remove.
  • Tag STLF and ELA drawdowns separately from overnight SLF advances in dashboards and CFP triggers; only the SLF reading moved.
  • For a month-end with an advance outstanding, LAR Chapter 2 points to 0% run-off on the secured funding. HQLA actually encumbered to the advance cannot remain in the HQLA stock, but where no specific securities are assigned within a pooled collateral arrangement, LAR (footnote 6 to paragraph 19) allows the institution to assume encumbrance in order of increasing liquidity value, subject to any concentration or diversification requirements of the central bank.
  • Pair any cut to end-of-day balances with a check that the Lynx credit limit, after own-name, NMLP and single-issuer limits, covers a plausible shortfall.
  • Diary the final LAR (2027), expected in February 2027 and effective 1 May 2027, and the outcome of the Bank’s SLF collateral and haircut review.

Sources and References

  • Bank of Canada, “Bank of Canada and OSFI Issue Joint Statement on Use of the Bank’s Standing Liquidity Facility”, market notice, 29 September 2026: bankofcanada.ca
  • OSFI, “Bank of Canada and OSFI issue joint statement on use of the Bank’s Standing Liquidity Facility”, 29 September 2026: osfi-bsif.gc.ca
  • Bank of Canada, Toni Gravelle, “Repo markets and monetary policy implementation”, remarks, 29 September 2026: bankofcanada.ca
  • Bank of Canada, Staff Analytical Paper 2026-26, “Everything You Want to Know About the Bank’s Standing Liquidity Facility… But were too afraid to ask!”, June 2026: PDF
  • Bank of Canada, Rules Governing Advances to Financial Institutions, issued 9 March 2026: PDF
  • Bank of Canada, Market operations, programs and facilities (Standing Liquidity Facility): bankofcanada.ca
  • Bank of Canada, Assets Eligible as Collateral under the Bank of Canada’s Standing Liquidity Facility: bankofcanada.ca
  • Bank of Canada, Lynx: bankofcanada.ca
  • Bank of Canada, “CIMPA and CDS announce the start of the trial period for the fail fee framework for Government of Canada securities transactions”, market notice, 13 August 2026: bankofcanada.ca
  • OSFI, Liquidity Adequacy Requirements (LAR) (2026) Chapter 1: Overview, 29 January 2026, effective 1 May 2026: osfi-bsif.gc.ca
  • OSFI, Liquidity Adequacy Requirements (LAR) (2026) Chapter 2: Liquidity Coverage Ratio, 29 January 2026, effective 1 May 2026: osfi-bsif.gc.ca
  • OSFI, Liquidity Adequacy Requirements (LAR) (2026) Chapter 7: Intraday Liquidity Monitoring Tools, 29 January 2026, effective 1 May 2026: osfi-bsif.gc.ca
  • OSFI, Guideline B-6: Liquidity Principles (2020): osfi-bsif.gc.ca
  • OSFI, “Backgrounder: Draft Liquidity Adequacy Requirements Guideline (2027)”, 21 May 2026: osfi-bsif.gc.ca
  • OSFI, Internal Liquidity Adequacy Assessment Process (ILAAP) for Deposit-Taking Institutions, Guideline (2027), draft, 21 May 2026: osfi-bsif.gc.ca
  • OSFI, “Letter to industry: Updates to OSFI’s Policy Plan”, 3 September 2026: osfi-bsif.gc.ca
  • Payments Canada, Lynx high-value payment system: payments.ca
  • Payments Canada, “Payments Canada launches Lynx, Canada’s new high-value payment system”, 1 September 2021: payments.ca

Next steps on the SLF for Lynx participants’ treasury and reporting teams

The joint statement closes no consultation and opens none. The next dated items on the same file are OSFI’s final LAR (2027), which the May 2026 backgrounder expects in February 2027 with effect from 1 May 2027 and describes as targeted changes to HQLA classifications, selected NSFR treatments and housekeeping, with no mention of the SLF; and the outcome of the Bank’s SLF collateral and haircut review. Two pending OSFI texts also bear on the CFP triggers discussed above: the draft Internal Liquidity Adequacy Assessment Process (ILAAP) Guideline (2027), published on 21 May 2026 with consultation closed on 19 August 2026, expects a CFP built on graduated action ladders tied to objective triggers and proposes phased implementation over fiscal years 2027 to 2029, and OSFI’s policy plan update of 3 September 2026 defers the draft Guideline B-6 to February 2027.

None of these dates needs to arrive before the internal work starts. Before the next monthly LCR submission, the artifact to produce is a one-page register of every internal document that treats an overnight SLF advance as a stress event, covering CFP triggers, risk appetite metrics, board escalation rules and any treasury pre-approval policy for central bank borrowing, each marked keep, recalibrate or remove against the 29 September 2026 statement.

Disclaimer: The information on RegReportingDesk.com is for educational and informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal, regulatory, tax, or compliance advice. Always consult your compliance officer, legal counsel, or the relevant supervisory authority for guidance specific to your institution.

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