Non-Maturity Deposit Stability: What BCBS Working Paper 47 Signals

On 20 February 2026 the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision published Working Paper No 47, a 35-page literature review titled “Literature review on non-maturity deposit stability: established factors and recent developments”. Non-maturity deposit stability is the question of how reliably sight deposits, current accounts and savings balances stay put when a bank comes under stress, and it is relevant to the LCR and NSFR where those Basel liquidity requirements apply: LCR outflow rates and NSFR available-stable-funding factors both incorporate assumptions about deposit stability.

The paper is a working paper. The Committee is explicit that the views are those of the authors and do not represent the official views of the Committee, its members or the BIS, and nothing in it amends a standard, a template or a remittance date. What it does is review the literature on established drivers of non-maturity-deposit stability and recent developments, including evidence surrounding the 2023 turmoil. The review finds some support for the view that changes to the banking and financial industry have affected deposit stability, but it also finds that recent volatility was substantially driven by traditional factors such as deposit insurance coverage and perceptions of bank insolvency. On that basis the authors conclude it is difficult to say whether the net effect has made deposit behaviour more volatile.

For a reporting team the practical read is narrow and specific. Your filings do not change this quarter. Deposit-stability assumptions are part of the Committee’s broader analytical work, while related NMD behavioural assumptions are relevant to internal liquidity and IRRBB modelling; the two frameworks do not use identical assumptions or identical deposit populations. That is where the paper earns attention.

Related reading: Liquidity Reporting: LCR, NSFR and ALMM Explained

What the Committee actually published on 20 February 2026

Working Paper 47 is a survey of the academic and supervisory literature, not a consultation and not a proposed rule. There is no comment window, no draft technical standard attached, and no new data point to report. For reporting purposes it has no operative obligation of its own. It is research relevant to the Committee’s broader analytical work, but the authors’ views are not the Committee’s official position.

That distinction matters because a Basel publication carrying the word “deposit” can be misread as a change to how deposits are weighted. The run-off rates and available stable funding factors that govern your returns live in the Basel liquidity standards and in each jurisdiction’s implementation of them, and those texts are untouched by a working paper. The paper reviews evidence relevant to NMD stability; it does not state that the Committee will revise the LCR or NSFR.

The Committee ran a stocktake of the March to May 2023 banking turmoil in October 2023, followed it with a G20 progress report on 11 October 2024 titled “The 2023 banking turmoil and liquidity risk: a progress report”, and has now added a literature review on the specific mechanics of deposit stability. Read as a sequence, these are the analytical building blocks of a liquidity-risk review that has not yet produced a single binding change.

The 2023 question behind the review

The review exists because the 2023 failures did not look like the deposit runs the Basel framework was calibrated against. The Committee’s own framing points to unusually fast depositor outflows during that episode, and to a set of developments that could plausibly have changed depositor behaviour: technological innovation in banking channels, shifts in banks’ funding sources, changes in the competition banks face, and the evolution of the legal and regulatory landscape around deposits.

The 2024 progress report is the more pointed of the two predecessor documents. It set out updated empirical analysis of the liquidity outflow rates experienced by distressed banks during the turmoil, and it assessed the materiality of liquidity risk factors that are not explicitly covered by the Basel III Liquidity Coverage Ratio. The report raises two distinct questions: whether prescribed LCR outflow rates adequately reflected the outflows observed during the turmoil, and whether material liquidity risks lie outside the LCR’s scope. It notes that digitalisation and social media amplified rapid outflows, while examples of risks outside the LCR include intraday liquidity needs, trapped liquidity and pre-positioning or collateral requirements.

Working Paper 47 then tempers the narrative. Rather than concluding that a new digital-era depositor has rewritten the rules, it finds that the classic drivers still explain much of what happened. Whether a deposit stayed or fled in 2023 still turned heavily on whether it was insured and on what the depositor believed about the bank’s solvency. The honest conclusion the authors reach, that the net effect on volatility is genuinely unclear, is itself the finding a supervisor has to work with.

Where deposit behaviour is priced into the LCR

To see why this is a reporting question as much as a research one, follow a retail balance through the LCR. In the EU implementation of the Basel standard, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/61 sorts retail deposits into behavioural buckets and multiplies each by an assumed 30-day outflow rate. Under Article 24(1), retail deposits covered by a qualifying deposit guarantee scheme that are either part of an established relationship making withdrawal highly unlikely or held in a transactional account are treated as stable and attract a 5% outflow, unless the higher-outflow criteria in Article 25(2), (3) or (5) apply. For an EU deposit guarantee scheme under Directive 2014/49/EU, a 3% rate may be authorised only for qualifying stable retail deposits up to EUR 100,000, where the scheme meets the Article 24(4) funding and seven-working-day repayment criteria and the competent authority has obtained the Commission’s prior approval under Article 24(5). Article 24(6) provides a separate 3% route for deposits covered by an equivalent third-country deposit guarantee scheme where the competent authority authorises it and the third country allows that treatment. Other retail deposits are generally multiplied by 10% under Article 25(1), subject to the other treatments in Article 25. Under Article 25(3), 10%-15% applies where the EUR 500,000 criterion is met or two of the criteria in Article 25(2)(b)-(e) are met; 15%-20% applies where the EUR 500,000 criterion plus another criterion, or at least three criteria in total, are met. For an EU credit institution, the currency criterion concerns a currency other than the euro or the domestic currency of a Member State.

The operational trap sits in the word “stable”. Article 24’s 5% treatment requires deposit-guarantee coverage and either an established relationship making withdrawal highly unlikely or a transactional account, and it is displaced where the higher-outflow criteria in Article 25(2), (3) or (5) apply. Being retail on its own does not deliver the 5% treatment. A high-rate, internet-only savings balance held by a customer with no other relationship is retail and is still a less stable deposit, or a higher-outflow deposit, depending on how many of the Article 25 criteria it meets. Article 24 and 25 categorisation must be supported by the regulatory criteria; the regulation does not prescribe a manual process. The post-2023 evidence gives particular attention to uninsured and concentrated deposits, but the Article 25 higher bands must still be applied using the criteria set out in the regulation.

Two adjacent buckets are worth keeping straight. Operational deposits, held for clearing, custody or cash management in a critically important relationship, run off at 25% under Article 27, dropping to 5% on the portion covered by a deposit guarantee scheme; a balance that merely arises from a correspondent banking relationship gets no operational treatment and runs at 100%. Non-operational deposits from non-financial corporates, sovereigns and public sector entities sit at 40% under Article 28, or 20% where covered by a scheme. None of these percentages moved on 20 February 2026, and none is proposed to.

The NSFR encodes the same split at a one-year horizon

The Net Stable Funding Ratio asks a structural, one-year question about funding stability, where the LCR asks a 30-day survival question: over that year, how much of this funding can the bank count on as stable? It answers with available stable funding factors, and it reuses the same retail dichotomy. Under the CRR, the standard NSFR applies a 95% ASF factor to qualifying stable retail deposits under Article 428n and a 90% factor to qualifying other retail deposits under Article 428m. For small and non-complex institutions that use the simplified NSFR with prior competent-authority permission under Article 428ai, the corresponding 95% and 90% factors are in Articles 428ao and 428an respectively.

The gap between a 95% and a 90% factor looks small until it is applied across a large deposit book. The NSFR reuses the LCR Delegated Regulation’s stable-versus-other-retail-deposit criteria, but it applies them within a one-year funding framework and to the retail funding categories specified in Articles 428m and 428n CRR. Working Paper 47 reviews evidence on NMD stability; it does not state that it is testing the calibration of the LCR or NSFR, and the paper itself does not change either ratio.

Under Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/3117, LCR reporting is monthly and uses C 72.00, C 73.00, C 74.00, C 75.01, C 76.00 and C 77.00; retail-deposit outflows are reported in C 73.00. NSFR reporting is quarterly: institutions using the standard NSFR submit C 80.00 and C 81.00, small and non-complex institutions using the simplified NSFR with prior competent-authority permission submit C 82.00 and C 83.00, and all institutions submit C 84.00. Available stable funding is reported in C 81.00 or C 83.00, as applicable. Working Paper 47 does not amend those reporting requirements.

Why a literature review lands on your models, not your ratios

The standardised percentages are fixed by regulation, so a bank should not change its Article 24 LCR treatment or the applicable CRR ASF factor because a working paper appeared. Working Paper 47 separately discusses NMD modelling, including deposit betas, deposit duration and the risk that ex ante assumptions about NMD behaviour prove wrong ex post. It does not itself prescribe an ILAAP recalibration or identify core/non-core splits or run-off and decay curves as regulatory parameters to be changed.

This is the internal liquidity adequacy assessment, and it is where the standardised ratio stops being the whole story. A bank that treats the LCR and NSFR as the complete picture of its deposit risk is reporting the regulatory minimum while leaving the harder question, whether its own modelled assumptions still hold after 2023, to one side. Our guide to the ICAAP and ILAAP sets out how those internal assessments are structured; Working Paper 47 can be used as an input to an institution’s internal review of NMD assumptions, but the paper does not prescribe an ILAAP recalibration or state a supervisory preference for a particular post-2023 calibration outcome.

Pillar 2 and the supervisory review of deposit assumptions

Supervisory scrutiny of liquidity risk management did not begin with the 2023 turmoil. The Basel Committee’s “Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision”, published on 25 September 2008, set out seventeen principles and gave supervisors an explicit remit to assess the adequacy of a bank’s liquidity risk management framework and to act where it is found wanting. Deposit-behaviour modelling is squarely within that remit, and the supervisory review process is the channel through which a weak assumption gets challenged.

The Committee has said where it intends to take the 2023 work. Its progress report committed to further analytical work, based on empirical evidence, to assess whether specific features of the Basel framework, including liquidity risk and interest rate risk in the banking book, performed as intended during the turmoil, and to strengthen supervisory effectiveness and identify issues that could merit additional guidance at a global level. Working Paper 47 addresses the same NMD-stability questions as the Committee’s broader analytical work, but its conclusions remain those of its authors rather than an official Committee position. The banking-book link is not incidental: some non-maturity deposits are modelled in both liquidity and IRRBB frameworks, but the populations are not identical. Under EBA/GL/2022/14, NMDs from financial customers should not be subject to behavioural modelling except where they are operational deposits. For deposits modelled in both frameworks, material differences between liquidity and IRRBB assumptions are a sensible subject for internal review. At EU level, NMD behavioural assumptions are explicitly addressed in the EBA’s IRRBB framework. The ECB’s formal supervisory priorities for 2026-28 are framed around geopolitical and macro-financial resilience and operational and ICT resilience rather than a named NMD-liquidity priority.

What to check in your liquidity returns now

There is no filing to redo and no deadline to diarise, so the useful work is preparatory and internal. The starting point is the categorisation that feeds the standardised ratios: whether the split between stable deposits under Article 24 and other retail deposits under Article 25 is documented, evidenced and defensible, and whether the share of the retail book that is above deposit-guarantee coverage is measured rather than assumed. Those decisions feed the retail-deposit outflow reporting in LCR template C 73.00 and, through the applicable ASF treatment, the NSFR available-stable-funding reporting in C 81.00 for the standard NSFR or C 83.00 for the simplified NSFR; C 84.00 is the NSFR summary template.

The second piece is the model behind the ratio. A reporting team can ask, ahead of any supervisor doing so, when the deposit-behaviour assumptions in the ILAAP were last recalibrated, whether that recalibration used data spanning the 2023 stress, and whether the liquidity and IRRBB models tell the same story about the same deposits. Any internal review should document the institution’s own evidence and calibration. Working Paper 47’s cautious conclusion is the authors’ assessment of the literature, not an official Committee conclusion or a substitute for institution-specific model validation.

Frequently Asked Questions

Does Working Paper 47 require us to refile or restate any LCR or NSFR return?

No. It is a Basel Committee working paper carrying the authors’ views, not the Committee’s official position, and it amends no standard, template or remittance date. There is no reporting action attached to it. The value for a reporting team is in reviewing the internal assumptions behind the ratios, not in changing anything already filed.

The paper is a global BCBS product. How does it reach an EU or Luxembourg bank in practice?

Indirectly. Basel standards bind through their implementation: in the EU that is the CRR and Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/61, supervised by the ECB and national competent authorities. A working paper has no direct effect at all. It influences EU banks only if the Committee later proposes to change a standard and the EU implements that change, or if a supervisor draws on the evidence when reviewing a bank’s own liquidity assumptions under the supervisory review process.

Which deposits actually count as non-maturity deposits here?

Non-maturity deposits are balances with no fixed contractual maturity, such as sight deposits, current accounts and ordinary savings accounts, where the depositor can in principle withdraw at any time. Term deposits with a defined maturity are treated on their contractual terms and sit outside the non-maturity population, though a term deposit maturing or breakable within the 30-day window is picked up separately in the LCR.

Is the 3% stable outflow rate something we can simply elect to use?

No. For an EU deposit guarantee scheme under Directive 2014/49/EU, Article 24(4) limits the 3% treatment to qualifying stable retail deposits up to EUR 100,000. The scheme must meet the specified ex-ante funding, additional-funding and seven-working-day repayment criteria, and the competent authority may authorise the treatment only after prior Commission approval under Article 24(5), supported by the required evidence on stable-retail run-off. Otherwise the Article 24(1) stable rate is 5%, subject to Article 25’s higher-outflow criteria. Article 24(6) separately addresses equivalent third-country deposit guarantee schemes.

Our retail book is heavily above deposit-guarantee coverage. What does that change?

For non-maturity retail deposits taken in the Union, the uninsured portion cannot qualify for Article 24 stable treatment because that treatment requires deposit-guarantee coverage; Article 25(1) applies a 10% outflow unless the higher-outflow criteria in Article 25(2) and (3) apply. Article 25(5) separately governs retail deposits taken in third countries. In the internal model, a high uninsured share is precisely the driver Working Paper 47 and the 2023 evidence flag as material, so it should be reflected in the behavioural assumptions and stress design, and not left to the standardised weighting alone.

How do these deposit assumptions connect to IRRBB?

Some non-maturity deposits are modelled in both liquidity and IRRBB frameworks, but the populations are not identical. Under EBA/GL/2022/14, NMDs from financial customers should not be subject to behavioural modelling except where they are operational deposits. For NMDs within the IRRBB behavioural-modelling scope, the Guidelines state that institutions should maintain, review and validate the relevant behavioural assumptions. Reconciling material differences between liquidity and IRRBB assumptions is a sensible internal control, but the primary sources reviewed do not establish a rule that the two models must use the same assumptions.

Where do social-media-driven or one-day digital runs fit in the LCR?

The LCR captures prescribed cumulative outflows over a 30-calendar-day stress period, but it does not model the within-period timing of a one-day or intraday run. The 2024 progress report raises questions both about assumed outflow rates and about risks outside the LCR’s scope, including intraday liquidity and pre-positioning constraints; it also notes that digitalisation and social media can accelerate outflows. There is no dedicated LCR field for digital-run speed.

Related Articles

• Liquidity Reporting: LCR, NSFR and ALMM Explained: how the three core liquidity returns fit together and where deposit outflows are captured.
• ICAAP and ILAAP: the internal capital and liquidity adequacy assessments where deposit-behaviour assumptions are tested.
• Deposit Guarantee Scheme Reporting: how coverage status drives the stable-versus-less-stable deposit split.
• IRRBB EBA Guidelines: the banking-book framework that models the same non-maturity deposits for repricing risk.
• ECB SREP 2026 Priorities: how supervisory review turns to liquidity and funding risk.
• SRB Liquidity and Funding in Resolution Guidance: how deposit and funding stability is assessed in a resolution context.

Key Takeaways

• BCBS Working Paper 47, published 20 February 2026, is a 35-page literature review; it carries the authors’ views and changes no standard, template or deadline.
• The review finds industry changes have had some effect on deposit stability, but concludes traditional drivers, deposit insurance coverage and perceptions of solvency, substantially drove the 2023 volatility.
• The stable-versus-other-retail-deposit distinction is reflected in both ratios: Article 24 generally applies a 5% LCR outflow to qualifying stable retail deposits, subject to the conditional 3% derogations, while Article 25 applies 10% to other retail deposits subject to its higher-rate rules. The standard NSFR applies 95% and 90% ASF factors under Articles 428n and 428m; the simplified NSFR uses Articles 428ao and 428an.
• The 3% stable outflow rate cannot simply be elected. For an EU scheme under Directive 2014/49/EU, it is limited to qualifying stable retail deposits up to EUR 100,000 and requires the Article 24(4) scheme conditions plus prior Commission approval under Article 24(5); Article 24(6) separately addresses equivalent third-country schemes.
• The paper does not change the fixed standardised factors. Working Paper 47 discusses deposit betas, deposit duration and the risk that ex ante assumptions about NMD behaviour prove wrong ex post; applying that evidence to an ILAAP review is an institution-level use of the paper, not something the paper itself prescribes.
• Reconciling liquidity and IRRBB deposit assumptions is a sensible internal control where the relevant deposit populations are modelled in both frameworks.
• Preparatory action: confirm the Article 24 and 25 categorisation is evidenced, measure the above-coverage share, and check when ILAAP deposit assumptions were last recalibrated against 2023 data.

Sources and References

• Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Working Paper No 47, “Literature review on non-maturity deposit stability: established factors and recent developments”, 20 February 2026: bis.org
• Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “The 2023 banking turmoil and liquidity risk: a progress report”, 11 October 2024: bis.org/bcbs/publ/d582.htm and press release p241011
• Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “Report on the 2023 banking turmoil”, October 2023 (press release): bis.org/press/p231005.htm
• Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision”, 25 September 2008: bis.org/publ/bcbs144.htm
• Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools”, January 2013: bis.org/publ/bcbs238.htm
• Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “Basel III: the net stable funding ratio”, October 2014: bis.org/bcbs/publ/d295.htm
• Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/61 (LCR), Articles 24, 25, 27 and 28: eur-lex.europa.eu
• Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (CRR), current consolidated text: Articles 428m and 428n for the standard NSFR, and Articles 428ai, 428an and 428ao for the simplified NSFR: eur-lex.europa.eu
• Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/3117, as amended, Articles 16 and 17 and Annex I Sections 7 and 10, governing current LCR and NSFR supervisory reporting: eur-lex.europa.eu
• Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, press release, 20 May 2026, “Basel Committee … considers targeted updates on liquidity risk principles”: bis.org/press/p260520.htm

Reading Working Paper 47 the way a reporting team should

Treat it as a dated marker in an open supervisory workstream. As of 20 May 2026, the Committee’s identified next step is to consider whether targeted updates to its Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision are needed, with a further update due later in 2026. The Committee has not announced an LCR or NSFR amendment proposal on deposit stability. Until it does, the concrete task is internal: pull the deposit-behaviour assumptions in the ILAAP, check they have been tested against the 2023 data, and check that any material differences between liquidity and IRRBB deposit assumptions are understood, documented and justified for the relevant populations.

Disclaimer: The information on RegReportingDesk.com is for educational and informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal, regulatory, tax, or compliance advice. Always consult your compliance officer, legal counsel, or the relevant supervisory authority for guidance specific to your institution.