FinCEN CVC Mixing Withdrawal: Mixer and Wallet Proposals Dropped

The FinCEN CVC mixing withdrawal took effect on 6 October 2026, when the Federal Register published two notices that the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network had filed for public inspection the previous morning. The first withdraws the October 2023 finding and proposed rule under section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act that would have treated international convertible virtual currency (CVC) mixing as a class of transactions of primary money laundering concern. The second withdraws the December 2020 proposal that would have required banks and money services businesses (MSBs) to report, record and verify certain CVC transactions involving unhosted wallets. FinCEN announced both on 5 October 2026 as part of what its release calls the administration’s deregulatory agenda.

Neither proposal was ever finalised, so current US filings stay as they are and the practical effect falls on compliance roadmaps. The unhosted wallet rule had been pending since 23 December 2020 and the mixing special measure since 23 October 2023, and build items, policy references and risk-assessment language written on the assumption that one of them would land now point at a rule that will not arrive in its proposed form. The two notices also close on different terms: for unhosted wallets FinCEN says it will take no further action on the proposal, while for mixing it says it will keep monitoring mixer activity and may take appropriate steps in the future.

Neither notice amends a regulation that is in force. The suspicious activity reporting rules, the funds travel rule and FinCEN’s 2019 guidance on CVC business models read the same on 6 October as they did on 5 October.

Related reading: FinCEN A7 Network Special Measure: Prohibiting Sub-Agent Transmittals

The dates and documents behind the withdrawal

Two rulemakings that began almost three years apart ended on the same day. The calendar a change log needs:

• 23 December 2020: FinCEN publishes the unhosted wallet proposal, “Requirements for Certain Transactions Involving Convertible Virtual Currency or Digital Assets”, at 85 FR 83840, covering banks and MSBs.
• 28 January 2021: FinCEN extends the reopened comment period on that proposal so that all comments are due by 29 March 2021 (86 FR 7352).
• 23 October 2023: FinCEN publishes its section 311 finding and proposed rule on CVC mixing at 88 FR 72701, with comments due by 22 January 2024.
• July 2025: the President’s Working Group on Digital Asset Markets, set up under Executive Order 14178, recommends that Treasury consider next steps on the mixing rulemaking.
• 5 October 2026: FinCEN announces both withdrawals; the notices are filed for public inspection as FR Doc. 2026-20429 (mixing) and FR Doc. 2026-20430 (unhosted wallets).
• 6 October 2026: Federal Register publication. Each notice withdraws its proposal as of the publication date.

One tracking detail matters for anyone who logs rulemakings by Regulation Identifier Number. Both withdrawal notices carry RIN 1506-AB47 in their headers, in the public-inspection versions and in the versions published on 6 October 2026 at 91 FR 63513 and 91 FR 63514. That is the RIN of the 2020 unhosted wallet proposal. The 2023 mixing proposal was issued under RIN 1506-AB64, docket FINCEN-2023-0016. A change log keyed only on RIN will attach the mixing withdrawal to the wrong rulemaking, so the safer keys are the FR document number and the 88 FR 72701 citation it withdraws.

What the section 311 mixing proposal would have required

Section 311, codified at 31 U.S.C. 5318A, lets the Treasury Secretary find that a foreign jurisdiction, a foreign financial institution, a class of transactions within or involving a foreign jurisdiction, or a type of account is of primary money laundering concern, and then impose up to five special measures. Measures one to four add recordkeeping, information collection and reporting duties. Measure five prohibits, or imposes conditions on, correspondent and payable-through accounts. The withdrawal notice recites that authority and its delegation to FinCEN.

The 2023 proposal used measure one only. It was a reporting and recordkeeping rule and would have prohibited no transaction. Measure five, the account-prohibition measure, was never proposed for mixing.

Under the proposal, a covered financial institution, a term tied to the definition of financial institution in 31 CFR 1010.100(t) and so reaching banks, broker-dealers and MSBs among others, would have reported a CVC transaction that it knows, suspects or has reason to suspect involves CVC mixing within or involving a jurisdiction outside the United States. FinCEN defined CVC mixing as facilitating CVC transactions in a way that obfuscates their source, destination or amount, whatever the protocol or service, and listed six methods:

• pooling or aggregating CVC from multiple persons, wallets, addresses or accounts;
• using programmatic or algorithmic code to coordinate, manage or manipulate a transaction’s structure;
• splitting CVC and sending it through a series of independent transactions;
• creating and using single-use wallets, addresses or accounts in a series of independent transactions;
• exchanging between types of CVC or other digital assets;
• facilitating user-initiated delays in transactional activity.

A CVC mixer was any person, group, service, code, tool or function that enabled that activity. Banks, broker-dealers and MSBs using internal protocols that would otherwise meet the definition were excepted, on condition that they preserved records of the source and destination of the CVC transactions and provided those records to regulators and law enforcement where required by law.

The report itself would have carried transaction data (amount in CVC and US dollars, CVC type, the mixer used if known, the mixer’s wallet address, the customer’s wallet address, transaction hash, date, IP addresses and timestamps, and a narrative) and customer data (full name, date of birth, address, email address, phone number and a tax identification or other government-issued identification number), in each case limited to information in the institution’s possession. Filing was proposed within 30 calendar days of initial detection. The proposal also stated that suspicious activity report (SAR) obligations would continue regardless of whether the institution filed the new report.

The breadth of that method list is where the proposal ran into trouble. On a plain reading, methods such as exchanging between types of CVC or splitting a transfer into several transactions also describe activity with no obfuscation purpose, and the trigger reached suspicion as well as knowledge. FinCEN’s withdrawal notice says the decision was informed by commenters’ concerns that the expansive definition could chill legitimate activity and impose a large reporting burden on covered institutions.

The unhosted wallet proposal and its two thresholds

The 2020 proposal addressed banks and MSBs and two kinds of value: CVC and digital assets with legal tender status (LTDA), a term the proposal defined for digital assets issued by a country and designated as legal tender. It targeted transactions whose counterparty used either an unhosted wallet or an “otherwise covered” wallet, meaning one held at a financial institution that is not subject to the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) and is located in a foreign jurisdiction on a FinCEN list. The proposal said the initial list would consist of the jurisdictions FinCEN had designated as of primary money laundering concern: Burma, Iran and North Korea. Because 1010.316 was never adopted, that list was never published.

Two thresholds did the work:

• Above $10,000, or multiple transactions aggregating above $10,000 in 24 hours, a bank or MSB would have filed a report on the customer’s transaction and the counterparty and verified the customer’s identity. FinCEN planned a form similar to, but distinct from, the currency transaction report (CTR).
• Above $3,000, the institution would have kept records of the customer’s transaction and the counterparty, including verifying the customer’s identity.

The proposed reporting rule would have sat in a new 31 CFR 1010.316 and the recordkeeping rule in a new paragraph (g) of 31 CFR 1010.410. That second location invites confusion. Paragraphs (e) and (f) of 1010.410, which FIN-2019-G001 calls the Funds Transfer Rule and the Funds Travel Rule, and the parallel bank recordkeeping rule for funds transfers of $3,000 or more in 31 CFR 1020.410(a), are untouched by the withdrawal. Only the proposed paragraph (g), with its counterparty-wallet record, is gone. A control mapping that labels everything at $3,000 in CVC as “the unhosted wallet rule” will need to be split before anyone retires a control on the strength of the 6 October notice.

Two withdrawals, two different exits

The notices are short, and the difference between them sits in a single sentence each.

For unhosted wallets, the notice is categorical: FinCEN is withdrawing the proposal and “will take no further action on this NPRM.” The reasoning given is the report of the President’s Working Group on Digital Asset Markets, “Strengthening American Leadership in Digital Financial Technology”, and the administration’s effort to make digital asset regulation fit for purpose.

For mixing, the notice withdraws two things: the finding that international CVC mixing is a class of transactions of primary money laundering concern, and the proposed rule that would have imposed special measure one. It cites the Working Group report for the statement that the administration “supports the ability of lawful users of digital assets to privately transact on a public blockchain” (the report’s own wording is that the Working Group supports “the ability of individuals to privately transact on public blockchains”), and it quotes the report’s acknowledgment that lawful users may turn to mixers for financial privacy on public blockchains. The Working Group report, which records that FinCEN received over 2,200 comments on the mixing proposal, had recommended that Treasury weigh illicit finance risk, privacy and burden on the financial sector in deciding next steps. The withdrawal then keeps a door open. FinCEN “maintains that illicit actors continue to use mixers and other tools and methods to hinder law enforcement investigations”, will continue to monitor mixer activity for indicia of money laundering, terrorist financing or other illicit finance, and may take appropriate steps in the future.

I read that asymmetry as deliberate. The unhosted wallet rulemaking is closed. The mixing rulemaking is closed too, but the agency has reserved its position on the underlying risk, and any future action would need a fresh basis instead of a revival of the 2023 docket.

The withdrawal of the finding has a practical edge for risk assessments. Policies that cite “FinCEN’s finding that CVC mixing is of primary money laundering concern” now cite a determination the agency has formally withdrawn. The sentence that survives, and that a risk assessment can quote accurately, is FinCEN’s statement in the withdrawal notice itself about continued illicit use of mixers.

After the FinCEN CVC mixing withdrawal: rules that still reach mixer exposure

The withdrawal notice removes a proposed reporting format. FinCEN’s own text keeps the risk signal, and the rules that already captured mixer activity are unchanged.

Suspicious activity reporting

A bank files a SAR on a transaction conducted or attempted by, at or through the bank that involves or aggregates at least $5,000 in funds or other assets where the bank knows, suspects or has reason to suspect that it involves illegally derived funds or is meant to hide or disguise them, is designed to evade BSA requirements, or has no business or apparent lawful purpose or is not the sort in which the particular customer would normally be expected to engage, and the bank knows of no reasonable explanation after examining the available facts (31 CFR 1020.320). The MSB rule sets a $2,000 threshold, words its third limb without the bank rule’s reference to what the particular customer would normally do, and adds a fourth: use of the MSB to facilitate criminal activity (31 CFR 1022.320). Both rules set a filing deadline of 30 calendar days after initial detection of facts that may constitute a basis for filing, and the bank rule allows up to 30 further calendar days where no suspect has been identified, never more than 60 calendar days after initial detection. Mixer use that meets those tests was reportable before October 2023, during the proposal’s life, and after its withdrawal. The 2023 proposal itself said SAR duties would continue alongside the new report, so the withdrawn report was always additive.

FinCEN’s 2019 CVC guidance

FIN-2019-G001, issued on 9 May 2019, sets out how FinCEN applies its MSB rules to CVC business models, and it addresses mixers directly. An anonymizing services provider, a person that accepts CVC and retransmits it in a way designed to prevent tracing back to the source, is a money transmitter under FinCEN regulations; concealing the source does not change that status. An anonymizing software provider, a supplier of tools that others use for the same purpose, is not a money transmitter, while a person using that software is a user or a money transmitter depending on the purpose of each transaction. The guidance also states that money transmitters that knowingly accept anonymity-enhanced CVC, or regular CVC that has been anonymized, in transactions subject to the funds travel rule must track the CVC through the different transactions and implement procedures to obtain the identity of the transmittor or recipient.

FinCEN’s guidance page still lists FIN-2019-G001. The same July 2025 Working Group report that shaped both withdrawals recommended that FinCEN evaluate whether its 2013 and 2019 digital asset guidance should be rescinded, modified or updated. That review, if it comes, is the event that could change how mixer exposure is treated for MSBs. The 6 October notices do not mention the guidance.

Self-custody transfers once the unhosted wallet rule is gone

The 2020 proposal was framed, in FinCEN’s own extension notice, as two additions: a new report for certain CVC and LTDA transactions analogous to the existing CTR, and new records similar to the recordkeeping and travel rules for funds transfers. With both additions withdrawn, the existing rules return to being the whole picture for self-custody counterparties.

The CTR remains a cash report. Each financial institution other than a casino files a CTR for a deposit, withdrawal, exchange or other payment or transfer involving a transaction in currency of more than $10,000 (31 CFR 1010.311), and for CTR purposes a transaction in currency means one involving the physical transfer of currency from one person to another (31 CFR 1010.100(bbb)(2)). The 2020 proposal said it would not alter the existing CTR requirement. The CTR rule itself does not reach CVC transfers, and with this withdrawal no CVC counterpart will come from the 2020 docket.

The funds travel rule still applies to CVC where a transaction is a transmittal of funds. Under 31 CFR 1010.410(f), a transmittor’s or intermediary financial institution located within the United States includes specified information in any transmittal order for a transmittal of funds of $3,000 or more. FIN-2019-G001 states that a transmittal order involving CVC qualifies as a transmittal of funds and may fall within the travel rule, with the $3,000 threshold applying to its CVC equivalent. The same guidance says that a person using an unhosted wallet to buy goods or services on their own behalf is not a money transmitter.

My working reading, which is interpretation and not FinCEN text: the travel rule is built around passing information along a chain of financial institutions, and the 2020 counterparty record was designed for transfers that leave that chain. With the proposal withdrawn, how much counterparty information a bank or MSB collects on transfers to and from self-hosted addresses becomes a matter for its risk-based AML programme and customer due diligence procedures. The 2020 docket, the federal rulemaking written specifically for unhosted wallet counterparties, is now closed.

One adjacent proposal sits outside the 5 October release. The Working Group report listed two FinCEN proposals as being withdrawn: the unhosted wallet rule and the October 2020 joint proposal on the threshold for collecting, retaining and transmitting information on funds transfers that begin or end outside the United States, which also proposed to clarify how those rules apply to CVC and LTDA (85 FR 68005). The 5 October release names only the unhosted wallet and mixing proposals. FinCEN and OFAC’s April 2026 joint proposed rule for permitted payment stablecoin issuers (91 FR 18582) states in a footnote that FinCEN intends to withdraw the 2020 travel rule threshold proposal, but no withdrawal notice for 85 FR 68005 had appeared in the Federal Register by 6 October 2026, so that proposal remains formally pending.

The EU side of a group programme

Groups that run one wallet-screening and counterparty-capture stack across US and EU entities should not read the US withdrawal as a group-wide change. Regulation (EU) 2023/1113, the Transfer of Funds Regulation, applies from 30 December 2024. Under its Articles 14(5) and 16(2), a crypto-asset service provider sending to or receiving from a self-hosted address obtains and holds the originator and beneficiary information, and for amounts exceeding EUR 1,000 takes adequate measures to assess whether the address is owned or controlled by its own customer. Our note on the FATF travel rule consultation for EU payment firms and CASPs covers where the international standard is heading, and our summary of the FATF stablecoins and unhosted wallets report sets out FATF’s risk findings on peer-to-peer transfers through self-hosted wallets.

Special measures remain in active use for crypto targets

The withdrawal is specific to the mixing class. Section 311 is unchanged, and FinCEN’s recent actions show it applying special measures where CVC is part of the money laundering pattern.

On 16 October 2025 FinCEN published a final rule under section 311 (90 FR 48295), effective 17 November 2025, imposing special measure five on Huione Group, a Cambodia-based financial institution. The rule prohibits covered US financial institutions from opening or maintaining correspondent accounts for or on behalf of Huione Group and requires special due diligence on foreign correspondent accounts. FinCEN found that Huione Group had laundered proceeds of cyber heists by the Lazarus Group and of CVC investment scams run by transnational criminal organizations based in Southeast Asia.

On 1 October 2026, five days before the withdrawal notices were published, FinCEN released a proposed rule under section 9714(a) of the Combating Russian Money Laundering Act that would add 31 CFR 1010.668 and prohibit covered financial institutions from transmittals of funds involving the A7 Network’s Sub-Agents, including transmittals to or from CVC addresses administered by or on behalf of a Sub-Agent. Our analysis of the FinCEN A7 Network special measure covers its definitions, the FI-Portal list mechanism and the notification duty.

The contrast with the mixing proposal is in the target. Huione and the A7 Sub-Agents are identified institutions and networks; the 2023 proposal targeted an activity class wherever it occurred abroad. The withdrawal shows FinCEN dropping the second approach for mixing. It says nothing about the first.

OFAC lists move on their own track

Sanctions screening is a separate regime, and the withdrawal notices say nothing about OFAC lists. The 2023 mixing proposal had cited OFAC’s 2022 actions against the mixers Blender.io and Tornado Cash. On 21 March 2025 Treasury announced that it had exercised its discretion to remove the economic sanctions against Tornado Cash, as reflected in its filing in Van Loon v. Department of the Treasury. The same statement said Treasury remained deeply concerned about the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s hacking and money laundering campaign and that US persons should exercise caution before engaging in transactions that present such risks. Screening rules keyed to Specially Designated Nationals list entries change when the list changes, and the 6 October notices did not change it.

Programme changes after 6 October 2026

The workload is clean-up, and most of it sits in documents.

The regulatory change log needs two entries, one per FR document number, each with the 6 October 2026 effective date, the Federal Register citation of the proposal it withdraws, and the finality language quoted from the notice. Recording the mixing withdrawal as “closed, FinCEN may act in future” and the unhosted wallet withdrawal as “closed, no further action on this NPRM” keeps that distinction available when the next FinCEN digital asset action arrives.

Policies, procedures and risk assessments that cite either proposal as forthcoming law need editing. Citations of the 2023 finding are the priority, for the reason set out above. References to FIN-2019-G001, the SAR rules and the funds travel rule stay.

Where a build backlog carries items scoped to one of the proposals, such as a 30-day mixing report populated with transaction hashes, wallet addresses and IP data, a CTR-style CVC report above $10,000, or a counterparty record for unhosted wallet transfers above $3,000, those items lose their regulatory driver. The underlying data is a separate question. Records retained as SAR supporting documentation remain subject to the applicable SAR retention rules, including the five-year periods in 31 CFR 1020.320 and 1022.320. Other records retained under the BSA remain subject to the retention rule applicable to the particular record. Nothing in either withdrawal displaces those independent retention requirements.

Training material that taught “the upcoming mixing report” or “the unhosted wallet reporting threshold” as pending obligations is out of date from 6 October 2026.

The watch list is short and specific: any FinCEN action on the 2013 and 2019 guidance following the Working Group recommendation; Treasury’s rules under the GENIUS Act, which the Working Group report describes as requiring Treasury to adopt rules treating permitted payment stablecoin issuers as financial institutions under the BSA; the status of the 2020 travel rule threshold proposal; and any new FinCEN step on mixers under the reservation in the withdrawal notice. For the Federal Reserve’s proposed collection from stablecoin issuers, see our note on FR UU reporting under the GENIUS Act.

Frequently Asked Questions

Did any institution ever have to file the proposed mixing report or the proposed unhosted wallet report?

No. Both were notices of proposed rulemaking, and FinCEN’s withdrawal notice describes the mixing rule as one that would have applied “if finalized”. Neither reached a final rule, so no filing obligation, form or deadline under either proposal ever took effect. SARs filed on mixer activity during that period were filed under the existing SAR rules, which continue to govern them.

If an institution built an internal $3,000 counterparty log for unhosted wallet transfers in anticipation of the 2020 rule, can it be retired?

The regulatory driver that log was built for, the proposed 31 CFR 1010.410(g), no longer exists. Before retiring it, check what else it feeds. If the same records support funds transfer recordkeeping or travel rule compliance under 1010.410(e) and (f) (or 1020.410(a) for banks), SAR investigations, or customer due diligence under the AML programme, those uses carry their own requirements, and records already created remain subject to whatever retention rule applies to the underlying transaction or report.

Does the withdrawal stop FinCEN from targeting mixers under section 311 again?

The withdrawal ends this finding and this proposed rule. Section 311 itself is unchanged, and the notice states that FinCEN may take appropriate steps in the future. A future action would rest on its own finding and its own procedure. Section 9714 of the Combating Russian Money Laundering Act, which FinCEN used for the A7 proposal, is a separate authority again, limited to concerns connected with Russian illicit finance.

A foreign-located exchange serves US customers. Does the withdrawal change its BSA position?

Nothing in either notice touches MSB status. FinCEN’s MSB rules still require each foreign-located person doing business in the United States as an MSB to designate a US-resident agent for service of process (31 CFR 1022.380(a)(2)), and FIN-2019-G001 still treats an anonymizing services provider as a money transmitter. The withdrawal removes two proposed reporting layers; the registration and programme rules that apply to a foreign-located MSB are where they were.

Does “legal tender digital asset” survive as a defined term?

LTDA was defined in the 2020 proposal for the purposes of that proposal. With the proposal withdrawn, the definition has no operative effect. The A7 proposal of 1 October 2026 shows FinCEN handling the point case by case instead: it includes the A7A5 stablecoin in its CVC definition for the purposes of that proposal despite A7A5 having legal tender status in at least one jurisdiction.

Our mixing typology training cites the 2023 proposal’s six-method definition. Is it still usable?

As a description of obfuscation techniques, the list is still a reasonable teaching aid, provided it is labelled as language from a withdrawn proposal. It should not be presented as a regulatory definition or as a reporting trigger. For the legal status of mixer operators, FIN-2019-G001 is the current FinCEN source.

Does the withdrawal change anything for an EU crypto-asset service provider in a US group?

No. EU entities remain bound by Regulation (EU) 2023/1113. Under Articles 14(5) and 16(2), a CASP must obtain and hold the required originator and beneficiary information for transfers to or from a self-hosted address and ensure that the transfer can be individually identified; where the amount exceeds EUR 1,000, it must additionally take adequate measures to assess whether the self-hosted address is owned or controlled by its customer. A group standard built to the US position alone would not meet the EU entity’s obligations.

Related Articles

• FinCEN A7 Network Special Measure: Prohibiting Sub-Agent Transmittals: the October 2026 section 9714 proposal that would bar transmittals, including CVC transfers, involving listed A7 Network Sub-Agents.
• FATF Stablecoins and Unhosted Wallets Report: AML/CFT Implications for EU Firms: FATF’s findings on stablecoins and peer-to-peer transfers through self-hosted wallets and what they mean for AML controls.
• FATF Travel Rule Implementation: The Enforcement Gap: where jurisdictions stand on implementing the travel rule for virtual asset service providers.
• FATF DeFi Report: When Control Brings a DeFi Arrangement Within the FATF Standards: how FATF tests control and influence when deciding whether DeFi participants fall within VASP obligations.
• FR UU Reporting: The Fed’s New Stablecoin Collection and FR Q Changes: the Federal Reserve’s proposed FR UU collection for stablecoin issuers under the GENIUS Act and the related FR Q and FR Q-2 changes.

Key Takeaways

• Effective date to log: 6 October 2026, for both FR Doc. 2026-20429 (mixing, withdrawing 88 FR 72701) and FR Doc. 2026-20430 (unhosted wallets, withdrawing 85 FR 83840).
• Key the mixing withdrawal to RIN 1506-AB64 and its FR citation; the RIN printed on both withdrawal notices belongs to the 2020 docket.
• Strike any policy line that quotes the 2023 finding on mixing as a live FinCEN determination; quote the withdrawal notice’s statement on continued illicit use of mixers instead.
• Split control inventories at $3,000 between the existing funds transfer and travel rules (1010.410(e) and (f), 1020.410(a) for banks), which stay, and the proposed 1010.410(g) counterparty record, which is gone.
• The CTR stays limited to physical currency above $10,000; the CVC analogue proposed in the 2020 docket will not be adopted.
• Mixer-linked activity meeting the SAR tests remains subject to the applicable SAR rules: generally 30 calendar days from initial detection, at a $5,000 threshold for banks and a $2,000 threshold for covered MSBs. For banks, if no suspect is identified on the date of initial detection, filing may be delayed for an additional 30 calendar days to identify a suspect, but in no case beyond 60 calendar days after initial detection.
• Next FinCEN events to watch: action on the 2019 CVC guidance, GENIUS Act BSA rules for stablecoin issuers, and the status of the 2020 travel rule threshold proposal.

Sources and References

• FinCEN, “FinCEN Announces Withdrawals of Proposed Digital Asset Related Rules” (5 October 2026): fincen.gov news release
• FinCEN, “Proposal of Special Measure Regarding Convertible Virtual Currency Mixing, as a Class of Transactions of Primary Money Laundering Concern; Withdrawal”, FR Doc. 2026-20429 (public inspection 5 October 2026, publication 6 October 2026): Federal Register and public-inspection PDF
• FinCEN, “Requirements for Certain Transactions Involving Convertible Virtual Currency or Digital Assets; Withdrawal”, FR Doc. 2026-20430 (public inspection 5 October 2026, publication 6 October 2026): Federal Register and public-inspection PDF
• FinCEN, “Proposal of Special Measure Regarding Convertible Virtual Currency Mixing, as a Class of Transactions of Primary Money Laundering Concern”, 88 FR 72701 (23 October 2023): govinfo
• FinCEN, “Requirements for Certain Transactions Involving Convertible Virtual Currency or Digital Assets”, 85 FR 83840 (23 December 2020): govinfo
• FinCEN, extension of comment period, 86 FR 7352 (28 January 2021): govinfo PDF
• FinCEN, FIN-2019-G001, “Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Certain Business Models Involving Convertible Virtual Currencies” (9 May 2019): FinCEN PDF and FinCEN guidance page
• President’s Working Group on Digital Asset Markets, “Strengthening American Leadership in Digital Financial Technology” (July 2025): White House PDF
• 31 CFR Part 1010 (BSA general provisions, including 1010.100, 1010.311 and 1010.410), 2025 edition: govinfo
• 31 CFR Part 1020 (rules for banks, including 1020.320 and 1020.410), 2025 edition: govinfo
• 31 CFR Part 1022 (rules for MSBs, including 1022.320 and 1022.380), 2025 edition: govinfo
• FinCEN, “Imposition of Special Measure Regarding Huione Group, as a Foreign Financial Institution of Primary Money Laundering Concern”, final rule, 90 FR 48295 (16 October 2025): govinfo PDF
• FinCEN, “Proposal of Special Measure Prohibiting the Transmittal of Funds Regarding Transactions Involving the A7 Network’s Sub-Agents”, notice of proposed rulemaking released 1 October 2026, 91 FR 63208 (5 October 2026): govinfo PDF
• FinCEN and OFAC, “Permitted Payment Stablecoin Issuer Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the Financing of Terrorism Program and Sanctions Compliance Program Requirements”, joint proposed rule, 91 FR 18582 (10 April 2026): govinfo PDF
• U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Tornado Cash Delisting” (21 March 2025): Treasury press release
• Regulation (EU) 2023/1113 on information accompanying transfers of funds and certain crypto-assets: EUR-Lex

Where the mixer file stands after 6 October 2026

Both proposals are withdrawn as of their 6 October 2026 Federal Register publication, and the existing BSA rules, FIN-2019-G001 and OFAC screening carry the full weight of mixer and self-custody controls for US institutions. FinCEN has closed the unhosted wallet docket without reservation and the mixing docket with one. The artifact to produce this week is the change-log entry for FR Doc. 2026-20429 and FR Doc. 2026-20430, followed by a sweep of policies and backlog items that cite either proposal. The next item to watch is any FinCEN publication on its 2019 CVC guidance.

Disclaimer: The information on RegReportingDesk.com is for educational and informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal, regulatory, tax, or compliance advice. Always consult your compliance officer, legal counsel, or the relevant supervisory authority for guidance specific to your institution.