EIOPA Private Equity Insurers: The Evidence Supervisors Should Request

On 6 October 2026 EIOPA published its Supervisory Statement on the authorisation and ongoing supervision of (re)insurance undertakings related to private equity, reference EIOPA-BoS-26/388, adopted by its Board of Supervisors on 29 September 2026. The EIOPA private equity insurers statement is addressed to national competent authorities and sets one EU-wide approach to two stages: the assessment of an acquisition, portfolio transfer or merger involving private equity (PE), and the supervision of the insurer for as long as the PE owner stays.

The pressure point is the acquisition timetable. Article 58 of the Solvency II Directive gives a supervisor a maximum of 60 working days from its acknowledgement of a complete notification to assess a proposed acquisition, and Article 59(2) allows it to oppose only on the Article 59(1) criteria or where the acquirer’s information is incomplete. The statement tells supervisors what to ask for inside that window: the entire financing structure, a justification for each level of ownership where the structure is complex or opaque, at least a three-year business plan tested against adverse scenarios. After closing, it points to conditions in the declaration of no objection, regular reporting on the PE entities, tailored financing reporting and exit scenarios in the ORSA.

Those expectations reach a PE-backed insurer’s reporting, actuarial and risk teams through supervisory requests and approval conditions; the statement itself contains no reporting template. Because the Article 58 assessment period runs only from the supervisor’s written acknowledgement of a complete notification, that evidence is best assembled before the notification is filed.

Related reading: ESAs Autumn 2026 Risk Update: The Reporting Data Behind the Warning

EIOPA-BoS-26/388 at a glance: dates and documents

A convergence tool for supervisors, without a comply-or-explain step

EIOPA issued the statement under Article 29(2) of its founding Regulation, which the statement itself describes as the mandate to build a common Union supervisory culture and consistent supervisory practices. It is addressed to supervisors. Insurers and PE acquirers are the subjects of the expectations, not the addressees, and the statement asks supervisors to apply it in line with risk-based and proportionate supervision.

The choice of instrument was deliberate. EIOPA’s impact assessment compared an internal document for NCAs only, Article 16 guidelines and a supervisory statement. Guidelines were rejected as disproportionate: every supervisor would have had to complete the comply-or-explain procedure, even though no PE-related cases were identified in half of the Member States over the past ten years. EIOPA chose a supervisory statement with a targeted scope, focused on the risks NCAs had actually reported, and lists its own monitoring of implementation as a cost of that option.

The scope trap sits in the definitions. The statement uses “PE-related” in a general sense covering the PE modus operandi, and says that references should be understood as encompassing a range of ownership structures and investment models, rather than referring specifically to PE firms or funds. It also says the identified risks may apply to insurers with no PE link at all, and that its list of risks is not exhaustive. An insurer bought by an owner that does not call itself private equity, but uses the same playbook of holding-company layers, affiliated asset management and heavy reinsurance, falls within that wording, so the same expectations can apply to it.

Two limits are worth stating plainly. The legal test stays where Solvency II puts it, in the Article 59(1) criteria and the existing governance and investment rules, with no PE-specific approval test added. And the statement covers EU supervisors only. UK insurers sit under the PRA’s separate Solvency UK regime, which has its own reporting track, set out in our PS18/26 Solvency UK reporting changes explainer.

EIOPA also asks supervisors to read the statement, among other texts, with Articles 29, 30, 34 and 36 of the Solvency II Directive, with its Supervisory Statement on the supervision of run-off undertakings (7 April 2022), its Supervisory Statement on the supervision of reinsurance concluded with third-country (re)insurance undertakings (4 April 2024), and with the Joint Guidelines on the prudential assessment of acquisitions of qualifying holdings (JC/GL/2016/01).

The market data behind the EIOPA private equity insurers statement

The evidence base comes from a survey of a sample of 16 NCAs and an exchange of concrete cases within the thematic platform on PE-related insurance undertakings that EIOPA set up in May 2024. EIOPA’s analysis suggests that PE-related insurers are active in only half of the EU Member States.

Where they are present, the numbers are material. Between 2014 and 2024, 37 acquisitions of control of insurance undertakings by PE firms were reported to EIOPA across 14 Member States, with a combined balance sheet of about EUR 270 billion (2023 figures). Eleven of those insurers were later sold.

At year-end 2024, 26 PE-related insurers remained active: 11 life, 11 non-life and four composite, held by around 20 PE firms across 13 Member States, with assets of EUR 260 billion (2023 figures). That is 2.4% of the total assets of the European insurance market, but above 15% in Greece, Luxembourg and Portugal. For comparison, the statement cites NAIC data that 137 PE-owned US insurers held 7.8% of the US industry’s total cash and invested assets at year-end 2024.

The impact assessment then compares PE-related insurers with market averages using Solvency II reporting data:

The averages hide the outliers EIOPA highlights. EIOPA found that the credit quality of PE-related life insurers’ assets does not differ significantly from the market on average, while a limited number of outliers hold relatively high exposures to non-rated fixed-income assets. In six cases, a significant share of an insurer’s fund investments was issued by its own PE shareholder or related entities, reaching 80.14% of total investments in one case. Four non-life insurers relied heavily on offshore, non-rated intragroup reinsurers.

For a reporting team, the useful detail is which fields made these patterns visible. The fund exposures EIOPA flagged include holdings not classified under the predefined categories of the Complementary Identification Code (CIC), which undertakings report under Annex V of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/894; EIOPA grouped them as “other funds”. The valuation comparison uses the valuation-method categories tied to Article 10 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/35. EIOPA concluded that systemic risk remains limited given the small number of PE-related insurers, an assessment it describes as contingent on current market conditions and open to revisiting if PE involvement grows, and said close supervisory monitoring at individual insurer level remains essential. Where an insurer fails, the policyholder backstop is a separate topic, covered in our article on EIOPA’s insurance guarantee schemes advice.

Before the 60-working-day clock: the acquisition file

The trigger is unchanged. Article 57(1) requires a proposed acquirer to notify the insurer’s supervisor in writing before acquiring or increasing a qualifying holding, including increases that take voting rights or capital to 20%, 30% or 50% or make the insurer its subsidiary (Member States need not apply the 30% threshold where they use a one-third threshold instead). Article 58 then sets the timetable: acknowledgement within two working days, an assessment period of at most 60 working days, and requests for further information no later than the 50th working day. A first request interrupts the period for up to 20 working days, extendable to 30 where the acquirer is situated or regulated outside the EU, or is not supervised under the insurance, UCITS, investment services or banking directives listed in Article 58(3). Whether a given fund vehicle falls into either branch is a factual question for each structure.

Against that clock, the statement advises supervisors to obtain:

• a complete list of the changes the acquirer plans after authorisation, and a business plan covering at least three years, in line with the third assessment criterion of the Joint Guidelines;
• where the business plan information is not sufficient, possibly the minutes of the PE investment committee or the board that decided the acquisition (the statement says supervisors could assess the benefits of requiring them);
• the capital commitments and their triggers, including whether they are limited to the target insurer or extend to the PE fund as a whole, under the financial soundness criterion in Article 59(1)(c);
• the shareholder agreement of the target and the partnership agreement of the PE fund itself, which supervisors need to assess carefully;
• for complex or opaque structures, a description of the PE firm’s governance, the entities influencing its decisions, the agreements between general partners and those entities, a justification for each level of the ownership chain, and any third-party interest that could affect management decisions at the insurer;
• the entire financing structure, tested in scenarios that include reverse stress tests such as falling premium volumes or a break in distribution, together with the ability to repay the acquisition debt.

The baseline scenario also has to be realistic. EIOPA gives a concrete example: a plan in which the loans are repaid using almost all of the insurer’s profit is not considered realistic. Supervisors should also assess, under Article 59(1)(d), whether the future business model allows the insurer to keep complying with prudential requirements, and whether the group structure allows effective supervision, information exchange and a clear allocation of responsibilities between supervisors. PE firms, in turn, should aim for structures that are not overly complex, for example by limiting the levels above the insurer.

What the statement leaves untouched is the legal test. Article 59(3) still bars Member States from imposing prior conditions on the level of holding or examining an acquisition against the economic needs of the market. My reading is that the practical lever is completeness: because Article 59(2) lists incomplete information as a ground for opposition, an acquirer that cannot produce the fund documents or the full financing chain within the window is exposed regardless of the merits. Paragraph 8.1, citing the assessment timeline and any planned significant changes to the business model, asks supervisors to encourage PE acquirers into an early dialogue before the formal notification, for qualifying holdings under Article 57 and for portfolio transfers under Article 39. Banking teams will recognise the logic from the CRD VI material acquisitions notification regime, which runs on a separate legal basis.

Declaration of no objection conditions and the reporting they can carry

The reporting consequences of the statement sit mostly after closing. Where the business model analysis identifies areas of significant risk, supervisors should consider measures to mitigate them, which can include conditions in the declaration of no objection (DNO). Paragraph 4.20 recommends that the DNO require specific, regular reporting on the PE entities: relevant changes in the group structure, and financial information on the main holdings of the PE group.

The statement sets no template, frequency or format for any of these items, and it does not say whether the acquirer or the insurer delivers the paragraph 4.20 reporting. Those choices sit with each NCA. Underneath them, the Directive’s own baseline continues: under Article 61 the insurer informs its supervisor of acquisitions or disposals of holdings that cross the notification thresholds once it becomes aware of them, and at least once a year reports the names of shareholders with qualifying holdings and the size of those holdings.

The practical gap is data ownership. Financial information on the main holdings of a PE group, the status of debt held at a parent company, and changes several layers above the insurer sit outside the insurer’s own books. If an NCA attaches a reporting condition of the paragraph 4.20 or 7.6 kind, the insurer will need a contractual or governance route to that data before the first reporting date.

Investment horizon, distributions and the exit scenario in the ORSA

EIOPA describes the classic PE model as buying a company, adding value and selling it after an investment horizon that typically runs five to ten years. It also describes newer models without an explicit intention to sell on a short horizon, including owners interested in using the assets that back long-term insurance liabilities as long-term funding, lending or investment for other companies owned by the PE firm. EIOPA links the limited-horizon model to a risk of misalignment with the insurer’s long-term commitment to policyholders (paragraph 4.9).

The statement targets the alignment between the owner’s horizon and those commitments. When evaluating a proposed acquisition, supervisors should test whether the investment horizon and the proposed business plan fit the insurer’s obligations to policyholders. In cases of significant mismatch, they may conclude that the business model is not viable, in particular where the mismatch comes with high initial distributions to shareholders, other short-term gains, incentives for an early exit, or investment strategy changes that are not in policyholders’ best interest (paragraph 4.12). EIOPA’s press release frames the concern as capital extracted through high distributions or other short-term measures that would damage long-term viability.

The ORSA is where this lands for the insurer. Article 45 of the Solvency II Directive already requires the overall solvency needs assessment to take account of the business strategy, requires the ORSA to be performed without delay after any significant change in the risk profile, and requires the results to be reported to the supervisor. The statement adds what supervisors should look for (paragraph 4.13): whenever necessary, for example where revenues are recurrently low or negative or the solvency position declines significantly, they should request exit-strategy scenarios in the risk assessment framework and the ORSA, and engage with the shareholders to assess those scenarios and determine proportionate supervisory measures. As the end of the investment horizon approaches, or after failed sale attempts, supervisors should monitor financial stability closely because the fund owners’ incentive to provide support may shrink or disappear. Capital policies should secure self-financing of the insurer, should not be biased by unrealised gains, and should consider the fund’s commitments across all companies in the same fund.

Governance under PE ownership: AMSB independence, shareholder rights and pay

General partners often exercise significant control over portfolio companies, the statement notes, while those investors may lack sufficient local experience in insurance. Supervisors should check that the insurer keeps an effective system of governance under Article 41 of the Solvency II Directive, with enough independence and countervailing power to prevent undue influence, and should verify, citing Article 59(1)(b) among other provisions, that the administrative, management or supervisory body (AMSB) collectively has the necessary knowledge of the insurer’s products, markets and regulatory framework.

The statement calls shareholder involvement in governance a normal feature of ownership structures, then lists the specific arrangements supervisors should test:

• affirmative voting rights within the AMSB, special shareholder rights or other arrangements that could undermine the independent exercise of responsibilities or create unmanaged conflicts of interest;
• shareholder representatives on company committees, including the purpose of those committees, their interaction with the people who effectively run the undertaking and how that interaction is documented;
• management remuneration and leveraged share schemes provided by the shareholder, for example with multipliers if targets are met.

On pay, the statement draws its own line: performance-related remuneration is not problematic in itself, provided it is appropriately designed and does not encourage excessive risk-taking or short-term behaviour inconsistent with the insurer’s long-term obligations.

Two Solvency II articles anchor the ownership side. Supervisors should assess whether the influence of PE-related entities is consistent with Article 62, which requires them to act where the influence of persons with qualifying holdings is likely to operate against sound and prudent management; the measures it names include injunctions, penalties against directors and managers, and suspension of voting rights. They should also have the ownership and voting rights of all shareholders explained from the ultimate beneficial owner down to the insurer, and pay attention to cases such as a management company exercising its voting rights independently from its parent, a situation the statement links to Article 63, which applies the Transparency Directive’s rules on voting rights and their aggregation. Control or significant influence is to be verified regardless of the size of the equity stake, for example through special rights in a shareholders’ agreement.

Intra-group transactions and affiliated asset managers

Asset management agreements, reinsurance and outsourcing with PE-affiliated entities are where conflicts of interest become transactions. Citing Article 258(5) of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/35, the statement asks supervisors to monitor intra-group transactions (IGT) and related transactions for application of the arm’s length principle, a fair value of commissions and an adequate IGT policy.

On investments, supervisors should check that asset management decisions remain independent, for example through countervailing power where the asset manager or adviser is also a shareholder or group entity, and that interests are aligned in line with the prudent person principle in Article 132. That article already says that, in a conflict of interest, the insurer or the entity managing its portfolio must ensure the investment is made in the best interest of policyholders and beneficiaries. The impact assessment’s six cases of fund investments issued by the PE shareholder or related entities illustrate the conflict-of-interest concern that this part of the statement addresses.

The reporting route for these transactions depends on a question the statement asks supervisors to settle: whether group supervision applies once intermediate holdings are taken into account. Where it does, Article 245(2) requires insurance and reinsurance undertakings, insurance holding companies and mixed financial holding companies to report significant intra-group transactions to the group supervisor regularly and at least annually, unless Article 215(2) applies, and very significant ones as soon as practicable. Where several insurers share the same ultimate shareholder, the statement asks supervisors to set up a college of supervisors or, at least, cooperation agreements to exchange information.

Private credit and alternative assets under the prudent person principle

The statement says the PE modus operandi is sometimes linked with a change in asset allocation towards private credit, non-rated credit and other alternative assets that typically offer higher yields but tend to be more complex, less liquid and harder to value. In some cases the insurer’s assets are used to support other businesses owned by or related to the same PE firm or fund, including by funding leveraged buyouts.

Where alternative or illiquid assets are material, supervisors should assess:

• how complex the Solvency II market-consistent valuation is, and whether the insurer has staff who understand the models and their limits, can carry out independent valuation, notably when the valuation process is outsourced, and maintain governance including AMSB oversight;
• whether the investments, including their illiquidity risk, remain compatible with the prudent person principle;
• how the underlying risks are captured in the SCR;
• how sound the asset-liability management is, given the profile of the insurance liabilities.

Article 133(2) of the Solvency II Directive bars Member States from subjecting investment decisions to prior approval or systematic notification, and the statement leaves that untouched. The statement’s investment expectations tie back to Article 132: insurers may only invest in assets whose risks they can properly identify, measure, monitor, manage, control and report. Article 132(4) adds that investments not admitted to trading on a regulated market must be kept to prudent levels, for assets other than those covered by Article 132(3), the paragraph on life insurance contracts where policyholders bear the investment risk.

Reinsurance, asset transfers and recapture risk

EIOPA observed strong reliance on reinsurance among PE-backed undertakings, often through intra-group and third-country arrangements. Its analysis of 11 non-life PE-related insurers found that, on average, 62.70% of their reinsurance recoverables were with EU reinsurers and 18.31% with Bermuda-based reinsurers. The reduction in capital requirements from that reinsurance is only partially offset by a higher capital requirement for counterparty default risk, depending on the reinsurer’s credit risk profile.

Supervisors should therefore assess effective risk transfer, with particular attention to:

• material increases in the use of reinsurance;
• contracts with high or variable commissions or termination clauses that can compromise effective risk transfer;
• contracts that pass investment risks and rewards to a PE-related reinsurer through the premium paid by the cedant, without constraints on that reinsurer investing in alternative or less liquid assets;
• increases in counterparty, liquidity and recapture risk.

Life business with profit-sharing carries a further consequence. Where a substantial transfer of investments takes place, through reinsurance or another arrangement, a high transfer rate on profit-sharing products may reduce policyholder benefits because the assets and returns left in the insurer shrink. Insurers are expected to assess and manage both the risks they retain and those attached to the transferred assets, to hold sufficient funds for the higher capital requirements if ceded assets are recaptured, and to make public disclosures on such transfers that are appropriate and detailed.

Balance-sheet optimisation and acquisition debt

Balance-sheet enhancement through asset allocation, derivatives, reinsurance or changed technical provision assumptions can tip into over-optimisation, the statement warns, including changes to expense assumptions and to future management actions. Supervisors could trace the flow of money in and out of the insurer, split into operating, investment and financing activities and other items such as outsourcing. When they evaluate a business plan or the capital position, they should require an analysis of changes in the best estimate and the SCR at the most granular level and in own funds, with explanations that cover investment management expenses and show consistency between future management actions, valuation models and the business plan. Data quality is part of the test.

The statement guards against the opposite error too: changes should not be considered problematic in themselves where they are appropriately evidenced and documented. A more dynamic investment strategy usually carries higher fees, and those fees should be reflected in the best estimate. After significant enhancements, the insurer is expected to evaluate whether the standard formula remains suitable for its SCR calculation.

On debt, the concern is collateralised acquisition finance secured on the insurer’s operations and assets. Supervisors should check that the business plan lets the insurer remunerate both capital and debt while keeping adequate solvency, liquidity and policyholder protection. Debt held at a parent company can raise the same issue where the insurer is the parent’s main source of revenue, so the whole financing structure is in scope. Where that debt sits outside the EEA and could materially affect the insurer, supervisors should consider additional group-solvency assessments, which may include a group SCR assessment at the level of the ultimate parent outside the EEA, taking into account the existing group supervision framework, equivalence decisions and cooperation arrangements. Liens or pledges on the insurer that exceed the PE fund’s commitments invested for the acquisition and management of the insurer are, in EIOPA’s example, considered high risk.

Frequently Asked Questions

Does the statement reach a minority PE stake that stays below control?

It can. The “PE-related” label covers a range of ownership structures, and the Article 57 notification duty starts at a qualifying holding, which can sit below control. A minority stake that comes with special rights in the shareholders’ agreement is squarely within the governance and influence questions, because supervisors are asked to verify influence on the insurer regardless of the amount of equity or voting rights.

We are a reinsurer. Does the statement apply to us in the same way?

The statement covers (re)insurance undertakings, so reinsurers are in scope. The impact assessment notes, however, that its NCA sample identified PE-related insurance undertakings but observed no cases involving PE-related reinsurance undertakings, so the evidence base behind the expectations comes from direct insurers.

Our new owner plans to turn the insurer into a back-book consolidator. Which other EIOPA text applies?

The statement names this model, an insurer modified to acquire or reinsure run-off companies or portfolios on a regular basis, and asks supervisors to read it with EIOPA’s 2022 Supervisory Statement on the supervision of run-off undertakings. Where the transferring insurer or reinsurer has its head office in a Member State, Article 39 of the Solvency II Directive covers the transfer, under the conditions laid down by national law, of contracts concluded under the right of establishment or the freedom to provide services. Such a transfer is authorised only if the accepting undertaking’s home supervisor certifies that it holds eligible own funds covering its SCR after the transfer; for insurance undertakings, the authorities consulted have three months to respond.

Does the statement change any QRT, the XBRL taxonomy or our public disclosures?

It names no template and no taxonomy. Taxonomy releases follow their own track: EIOPA’s DPM and XBRL page lists Solvency II taxonomy 2.10.0, published on 3 July 2026 and applicable from the Q1 2027 reporting reference period, and the statement does not refer to it. The one disclosure point is narrow: public disclosures on substantial asset transfers should be appropriate and detailed.

Is a sponsor-funded management equity plan a red flag for the supervisor?

Not automatically. Supervisors are asked to examine management remuneration and leveraged share schemes provided by the shareholder, including multipliers tied to targets, and to judge whether the incentives fit sound and prudent management and policyholder interests. Performance-related pay passes that test where it is appropriately designed and does not push excessive risk-taking or short-term behaviour.

Will the supervisor require us to move from the standard formula to an internal model?

The statement only goes as far as asking the insurer to evaluate whether the standard formula remains suitable after significant balance-sheet enhancements; it is silent on what follows from that evaluation. Any further step would come from the supervisor’s existing Solvency II powers, outside this statement.

Is there a deadline by which supervisors must apply the statement?

The statement sets no application date, transition or reporting deadline. It was adopted on 29 September 2026 and published on 6 October 2026, and because it is a supervisory statement there is no comply-or-explain notification to wait for. EIOPA lists monitoring of its implementation as part of the chosen approach.

Related Articles

• ESAs Autumn 2026 Risk Update: The Reporting Data Behind the Warning: the ESAs’ autumn 2026 risk update on bank private credit exposures and the DORA and large exposures data behind it.
• CRD VI Material Acquisitions: The New EBA Notification Regime: the EBA’s final RTS and ITS on material acquisitions, transfers, mergers and divisions, with notification thresholds and information requirements for banks.
• EIOPA Insurance Guarantee Schemes Advice: What Insurers Should Track: EIOPA’s advice on minimum common standards for insurance guarantee schemes, from eligible policies to payout limits and funding.
• PS18/26 Solvency UK Reporting: The 31 December 2026 Changes: the PRA’s Solvency UK reporting changes from 31 December 2026, including XBRL and template edits.

Key Takeaways

• Test acquisition debt service against the insurer’s profit: EIOPA treats a baseline that repays loans from almost all of it as unrealistic, and liens above the fund’s own commitment as high risk.
• Agree with the sponsor, in the deal documents, how PE-group structure changes and main-holding financials will reach the insurer if the DNO carries a reporting condition.
• Check whether the change of control and the planned changes amount to a significant risk-profile change under Article 45(5); if they do, Article 45(5) requires the ORSA without delay, and the statement says supervisors should request exit-strategy scenarios in it whenever necessary (paragraph 4.13) and tailored stress test information (paragraph 7.7).
• Hold arm’s length evidence, commission benchmarks and the IGT policy for every arrangement with a PE-affiliated asset manager or reinsurer.
• Review CIC assignments and valuation-method flags on fund and private credit positions; EIOPA’s analysis used both, in its PE-versus-market valuation-method table and its breakdown of funds outside the predefined CIC categories.
• For intra-group or third-country reinsurance, document risk transfer, commission and termination terms, and the funding needed if ceded assets are recaptured.

Sources and References

• EIOPA, Supervisory Statement on the authorisation and ongoing supervision of (re)insurance undertakings related to private equity, EIOPA-BoS-26/388 (6 October 2026): Supervisory Statement (PDF)
• EIOPA, Impact Assessment accompanying the Supervisory Statement, EIOPA-BoS-26-387 (6 October 2026): Impact Assessment (PDF)
• EIOPA, publication page for the Supervisory Statement: https://www.eiopa.europa.eu/publications/supervisory-statement-authorisation-and-ongoing-supervision-reinsurance-undertakings-related-private_en
• EIOPA news, EIOPA sets EU-wide expectations for the supervision of private equity-backed insurers (6 October 2026): https://www.eiopa.europa.eu/eiopa-sets-eu-wide-expectations-supervision-private-equity-backed-insurers-2026-10-06_en
• EIOPA news, consultation launch on the supervisory statement (3 February 2026): https://www.eiopa.europa.eu/eiopa-seeks-input-supervisory-statement-authorisation-and-supervision-undertakings-owned-private-2026-02-03_en
• Directive 2009/138/EC (Solvency II), Articles 39, 41, 45, 57 to 63, 132, 133 and 245: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2009/138/oj
• EIOPA, Solvency II Single Rulebook, Article 245 of Directive 2009/138/EC (consolidated text): https://www.eiopa.europa.eu/rulebook/solvency-ii-single-rulebook/article-2332_en
• Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 establishing EIOPA, Articles 4(2), 16 and 29(2): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2010/1094/oj
• Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/35, Articles 10 and 258: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2015/35/oj
• Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/894 (Solvency II reporting templates ITS), Annex V: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2023/894/oj
• EIOPA, Supervisory Statement on the supervision of run-off undertakings (7 April 2022): https://www.eiopa.europa.eu/publications/supervisory-statement-supervision-run-undertakings_en
• EIOPA, Supervisory Statement on the supervision of reinsurance concluded with third-country (re)insurance undertakings, EIOPA-BoS-24-075 (4 April 2024): https://www.eiopa.europa.eu/publications/supervisory-statement-supervision-reinsurance-concluded-third-country-reinsurance-undertakings_en
• Joint Committee of the ESAs, Joint Guidelines on the prudential assessment of acquisitions and increases of qualifying holdings in the financial sector, JC/GL/2016/01: https://www.eba.europa.eu/regulation-and-policy/other-topics/joint-guidelines-for-the-prudential-assessment-of-acquisitions-of-qualifying-holdings
• EIOPA, Supervisory reporting: DPM and XBRL (Solvency II taxonomy releases): https://www.eiopa.europa.eu/tools-and-data/supervisory-reporting-dpm-and-xbrl_en

First step for a PE-backed insurer: the ownership and financing pack

For an insurer in a sale process, or one already owned by a PE fund, the artifact to produce now is a single ownership and financing pack: the holding chain from ultimate beneficial owner to insurer with a rationale for each layer, the fund’s partnership and shareholder agreements, acquisition debt with its security and repayment plan, the IGT register for affiliated asset managers and reinsurers, and the ORSA exit scenarios. Have it ready for the early dialogue that paragraph 8.1 asks supervisors to encourage, before the Article 57 notification, because the 60-working-day period runs only from the supervisor’s written acknowledgement of a complete notification.

Disclaimer: The information on RegReportingDesk.com is for educational and informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal, regulatory, tax, or compliance advice. Always consult your compliance officer, legal counsel, or the relevant supervisory authority for guidance specific to your institution.